

**Organised theft of commercial vehicles and their
loads in the European Union**

No.IP/B/TRAN/IC/2006-194

Organised theft of commercial vehicles and their loads in the European Union

No.IP/B/TRAN/IC/2006-194

A.W. van den Engel

E. Prummel

This study has been financed by European Parliament.

Reference R20070110/30599000/AEN/GJO

Rijswijk, April 2007

© The use of figures and/or text from this report is permitted if the source is clearly mentioned. Copying of this report is only permitted with written permission from DG-IPOL.

Contents

0	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	VII
1	INTRODUCTION	1
1.1	Background	1
	1.1.1 Road freight dominance	1
	1.1.2 Definition of organised theft	1
	1.1.3 Relevant remarks ECMT 2002	1
1.2	Objectives	2
	1.2.1 Theft of trucks and lorries	2
	1.2.2 Nature and extent of organised theft in the road transport sector of the EU	3
	1.2.3 Tackling the problem in the Member States	3
	1.2.4 Tackling the problem at the EU level	3
1.3	Top of the iceberg	3
	1.3.1 Unclaimed property	3
	1.3.2 Total costs of cargo theft	4
1.4	Grouping of countries	4
	1.4.1 Risk level	4
	1.4.2 Activity level	7
	1.4.3 Country groups	7
1.5	Sources of information	9
1.6	Structure of the report	10
2	STATISTICAL BACKGROUND	11
2.1	Data availability	11
	2.1.1 The Parsec project	11
	2.1.2 TAPA EMEA IIS-database	12
	2.1.3 Other information	13
2.2	Total loss value	14
2.3	Yearly direct and indirect damage	15
	2.3.1 Direct and indirect damage	15
	2.3.2 Total direct damage	15
	2.3.3 Method for damage calculation	16
	2.3.4 Results	16
2.4	Affected market segments	18
2.5	Forms and methods of thefts	19
	2.5.1 Location of the theft	19
	2.5.2 Method of theft	20
2.6	Type of organisations	21
	2.6.1 Vast reseller network	21
	2.6.2 Changing tactics	21
	2.6.3 OCTA: Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2006	21
	2.6.4 Conclusion	22
2.7	Hot Spots	22
	2.7.1 Remarks	22
	2.7.2 Per Country	22

2.7.3	Per region	24
3	CURRENT ACTIONS	25
3.1	Stakeholders' (re)action	25
3.1.1	Stakeholders (see also figure 3.1)	25
3.1.2	Actions taken	26
3.2	Authorities' attitude towards the problem	29
3.2.1	Missing data	29
3.2.2	Organised crime	29
3.2.3	Substantial losses	29
3.2.4	Result	29
3.3	Preventive measures	29
3.3.1	Underestimate	29
3.3.2	National initiatives	30
3.3.3	Europol and Eurojust	30
3.3.4	Speed vs. profoundness	30
3.4	Actual practices	31
3.5	Response from authorities	31
3.6	Treaty of Prüm	32
4	RECOMMENDATIONS	35
4.1	Highlights from chapter 1, 2 and 3	35
4.2	Introduction	36
4.3	Recommendations to: Shippers	36
4.3.1	Need for a powerful anti-theft shippers' organisation.	36
4.3.2	Provision of security procedures in the supply chain	37
4.3.3	Supply chain approach: mapping chains, finding weak points	37
4.3.4	Supplying of secure parking areas	38
4.4	Recommendations to: Transport operators	38
4.4.1	Prevention of information leaks	38
4.4.2	Use of adequate equipment	39
4.4.3	Supplying secure parking areas	39
4.5	Recommendations to: Insurance companies	39
4.5.1	Coordinating the collection of data	39
4.5.2	Promoting anti-theft procedures	40
4.6	Recommendations to: Keepers of facilities	40
4.6.1	Parking fees and willingness to pay	40
4.6.2	Supplying parking areas	41
4.6.3	Balanced Supply of secure parking areas	41
4.7	Recommendations to: Authorities	42
4.7.1	Coordinated actions	42
4.7.2	Define parking areas as a part of the infra-structure	43
4.7.3	Defining the TERN as secure transport corridors	44
4.7.4	Dedicating ample resources	44
ANNEX I	COUNTRY GROUPING	45
ANNEX II	TREATY OF PRÜM	49
ANNEX III	CALCULATION METHODOLOGY	53

ANNEX A	QUESTIONNAIRES	57
A.1	Stake-holder questionnaire	58
A.2	Parsec-questionnaire	67
ANNEX B	TAPA EMEA IIS INCIDENT STATISTICS	75
ANNEX C	MAIN SOURCES OF INFORMATION	93
ANNEX D	MAIN RESULTS FROM STAKE-HOLDER QUESTIONNAIRE	97
ANNEX E	TAPA EMEA MEMBERS	105
ANNEX F	ABBREVIATIONS	111

0 Executive summary

0.1 Road freight dominance

Road freight transport is the dominating transport mode in freight transport in the European Union. With a market share of approximately 72.2% in the total land-based transport of goods, the significance of road freight transport for the economy of the EU is obvious. This dominance implies that each day, measured in money terms, many billions of Euros are moved on the Trans European Road Network (TEN-R) which constitutes the backbone of the EU economy. This fact has not escaped the criminal mind and with the increase of transport volumes security concerns with regard to road freight transport have increased as well.

0.2 Definition of organised theft

In this study we see organised theft as all vehicle and/or freight theft of which 'the circumstances of the crime suggest that the theft was well-planned and that the robbers knew exactly what the target goods of the theft were'.

0.3 Claimed versus actual loss value

There might be a large gap between the property value that is claimed (and therefore forms the basis for the statistics) and the actual value of the property that has been stolen. The reason for this (non-) claiming behaviour may be found in the fact that transport operators tend to maintain an 'own risk' value. And the feared loss of image.

One result of this non-claiming behaviour of transport operators is that the few statistics that are available on total value of stolen cargo and that are based on the claimed loss of property value, will show an underestimate of the real loss of property value.

0.4 Data (un)availability

Although a number of countries subsequently produced data on vehicle theft, these data could not always be accepted because it could not be directly interpreted as data related to the theft of tractors/(semi-) trailers/lorries but were mixed with data on small commercial vehicles (vans) or sometimes even with the theft of cars. Even in the best case, the data is not for 100% reliable.

It is difficult to extract a trend from such a limited data set. Looking at theft levels in the early 1990's it appears that the levels in the last 5 years are higher. It must be remarked however, that also the transport performance has grown significantly in the last decade and it is very doubtful that vehicle theft has increased more than proportional.

0.5 TAPA EMEA IIS incident database

Although several initiatives are taken to solve the problem of missing and/or incomplete information, one initiative is of special interest. This is the so-called TAPA EMEA IIS incident database. This database is maintained by the members of the TAPA EMEA organisation. The members of this organisation maintain a 'members only' incident database. An incident in this case is a certain criminal act against (road) cargo.

0.6 Total loss value

Although the estimates are rather rough, figures show a clear picture of the magnitude of the direct loss of value caused by theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle in the European Union. Bearing in mind that the figures of several Member States are missing, the total loss of value can be estimated at more than €8,2 Billion each year. Of this amount about €450 million is not declared by the transport operators. If the loss value is related to the number of loaded trips, a value of about € 6,72 per trip results.

0.7 Location of the thefts

Of all incidents reported during the period from 2003 till 2006, about 41% of all the incidents has been located during the driving phase of the trip; this means that nearly 60% of all thefts has taken place during a stop. Theft on secure parking areas is fairly limited; however, for more than a quarter of all thefts the non secure parking areas is reported as location. The remaining quarter of the thefts is reported to have taken place at certain facilities that are visited during the trip, e.g. facilities at origin and destination, mode shift facilities

0.8 Type of thefts

With a share of more than 60% of all reported incidents is theft from the vehicle without further reports on, for instance, threats towards the driver or tearing up of the canvas of the load unit, the most important method. In nearly 15% the vehicle (mostly also with cargo) is stolen. Another 15% and a very worrying kind of method of theft is hijacking and (sometimes even armed) robbery.

0.9 Type of criminal organisations

Although some initiatives concerning the type of organisations that arranges the theft are well under way, a clear picture does not exist. However, the fact that more and more complete truck loads are stolen and seemingly not at random, at least suggests that there exists a large network of 'resellers' of stolen property; a truckload of a few hundred identical flat screen television sets is not easily (re)sold in a local pub.

Also the fact that such a quantity is stolen means that there is a market for this goods.

0.10 Rat race between criminals and their targets

Shippers and thieves are caught in a rat race. After experiencing rising levels cargo theft starting about ten years ago, the shippers have responded by re-evaluating their supply and distribution chain. Methods that have been applied are strategic partnerships with forwarders and transport operators, driver background checks and all kind of technical systems installed in the trucks. Drivers are advised on safe behaviour like the use of secure truck stops.

The criminal organisations seem to react to these changes with more aggressive methods. They make use of bogus police officers, knockout gas that disables the driver and brute force to enter the vehicle.

Although 'opportunity-thefts' will remain to play a role in the theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle, there are reasons to believe that at least the bigger hits are well organised. It also seems that a substantial part of the thefts is 'on order'.

0.11 'Hot spots'

Figures show that the large and/or main transit countries are on top of the listing.

One conclusion seems to be obvious, densely populated areas are well represented. Examples are: Greater London, Flemish Region (corridor: Brussels-Antwerp), Ile-de-France, Madrid.

0.12 Low level of priority at governments

Related to the fact that the magnitude of the problem of organized theft is not clear, from the national government point of view there seems to be a fairly low level of priority to fight this problem. This is especially clear when compared with counter-terrorism actions. The low priority shows by the (limited) level of nation wide actions taken by the national governments to fight this problem.

This low priority is possibly due to an information gap, the seriousness of the problem seems therefore to be underestimated by policy makers. This causes that nation-wide actions initiated by the national governments and regarding the fight against the theft of property (cargo and/or freight vehicle) in road freight transport seems to have low priority.

0.13 Need for a coordinated action

The fact that the bulk of the theft seems to be very well organised, makes the need for coordinated counter-action even more necessary. From this point of view, the level of actions comparable with that taken against trafficking of people and smuggling of drugs are entirely defensible.

0.14 Organised theft may hinder the further development of the European Union

The underestimate of the negative effect of the problem of stolen property in road freight transport on the (further) economic development of the European Union in general and the Member States in particular, causes a too low level of

counter-theft programs. Especially since the theft of cargo is becoming more and more the working area of highly organised international criminal teams, actions to fight this problem have to be of the same magnitude.

As the magnitude of the problem of organized theft cargo and/or freight vehicles especially on an integrated European level is (possibly) largely underestimated, the political interest in fighting this problem on an European scale is too low and consequently, so are the budgets. Unless there will be an EU support for upgrading the fight against organized theft to an integrated European level, the existing limited budgets allow, at best, only national initiatives.

0.15 Europol and Eurojust

Two EU- institutions are particularly relevant in the light of fighting organised theft of cargo and/or vehicles, namely: Europol and Eurojust.

Both institutions are said to form a EU-wide platform on which the Member States can share information on, amongst other issues, all kinds of fighting crime related actions. In this way, also in the fight against cargo and/or vehicle theft coordinated action can be initiated. As far as we were able to find out little till now is done on this subject within the two organizations yet. The main field of expertise of Europol is the collection and distribution of intelligence and of Eurojust, the coordination of the imbedding of certain crime-fighting actions in a legal framework. Unfortunately, this expertise seems not to be used for the fight against organized theft of vehicles and loads.

0.16 Treaty of Prüm

This Convention between several Member States addresses the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, *cross-border crime* and illegal migration. The main items of the Treaty are:

- improved exchange of information,
- the provisions of this Convention brought within the legal framework of the European Union,
- to establish the necessary legal and technical conditions for that purpose,
- to supplement this Convention with further agreements, allowing automated searching of data in other appropriate records, in so far as is necessary and reasonable for the purpose of stepping up cross-border cooperation.

In the light of the fight against organized theft of commercial vehicles and their loads it is therefore highly recommended to establish an European Union wide support by signing of the Treaty of Prüm by the other Member States.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Road freight dominance

Road freight transport is the dominating transport mode in freight transport in the European Union. With a market share of approximately 72.2% in the total land-based transport of goods, the significance of road freight transport for the economy of the EU is obvious. This dominance implies that each day, measured in money terms, many billions of Euros are moved on the Trans European Road Network (TEN-R) which constitutes the backbone of the EU economy. This fact has not escaped the criminal mind and with the increase of transport volumes (amongst others because of gradual increase of the EU with new Member States) security concerns with regard to road freight transport have increased as well.

1.1.2 Definition of organised theft

In this study especially the fight against organised theft of commercial vehicles and their loads is the main item to be addressed. However, before the results of the fact finding can be presented, we must arrive at a clear definition of 'organised theft'.

In this study we see organised theft as all vehicle and/or freight theft of which 'the circumstances of the crime suggest that the theft was well-planned and that the robbers know exactly what the target goods of the theft were'.

1.1.3 Relevant remarks ECMT 2002

Already in 2002 the ECMT stated in their study¹ on crimes in road freight transport that:

'There is no simple way to provide a clear picture of the extent and nature of the theft of goods and commercial vehicles in Europe. This is because:

- Historical and legal practices and codes vary between countries and thus the definitions of theft and the information collected on the precise occurrence/timing of the crime differ and are not comparable.
- Each country has a unique system of gathering information about vehicle theft and goods theft which does not facilitate comparable studies.
- The collation of information is not always undertaken at a national level.
- Most of the systems set up by national authorities are intended for operational purposes and not for analytical purposes.
- The categorisation of vehicles is inconsistent and does not always distinguish between Light and Heavy Goods Vehicles.

¹ 'Crime in road freight transport'; ECMT, 2002

- Data on theft of goods is not normally collected from the authorities collecting data on vehicle theft.'

Concerning priorities, 'in most countries vehicle and goods theft is not seen as a priority and few resources are given to collecting and analysing data on it. The same is true at the international level'.

And concerning recommendations,

- 'the collection and analysis of information is essential to the fight against crime in transport. Regular compilation and gradual improvement of data are needed to understand better the extent and nature of the problem and to develop strategies to deal with it. Resources need to be given to these tasks.
- It is necessary to gradually improve the comparability of available data. To this end, two layers of information are required: the first concerns the categorisation and identification of vehicles and the second the categories of stolen goods, the location and mode of theft. The definitions [...] theft of goods.
- In each country, relevant data are available from different sources such as police, interior ministries, transport authorities, insurance companies. Closer contacts and improved co-ordination between these sources is needed at national level.
- At international level, international organisations such as Interpol and Europol are best placed to work on improving data on vehicle theft as they are the points of reference for the national police authorities. In the medium term, they should examine how to take on this task.
- In the short term, ECMT could continue to work on this subject in co-operation with other authorities. The data here should be updated in two years.
- Private companies, shippers, operators, insurance companies all have a keen interest and can also contribute to providing a better understanding of the nature of crime and on finding ways to combat it'.

One of the main questions that has to be addressed in this study is therefore: 'What has moved in the fight against (organised) crime in road freight transport since these conclusions were drawn and these recommendations were put forward?'

1.2 Objectives

1.2.1 Theft of trucks and lorries

Although organised theft of lorries, trucks and their cargo appear to be a growing problem for the road transport sector in the European Union, at present a clear broad picture seems not to be available. However, Europol states in its overview on motor vehicle crime 2006 that lorries and trucks have become more and more a target in recent years.

1.2.2 Nature and extent of organised theft in the road transport sector of the EU

The first general objective of the project is to investigate the nature and extent of organised theft in the road transport sector of the European Union. Questions to be answered are:

- a) Are there indications of the yearly direct and indirect damage in the EU as a result of theft of cargo and commercial road transport vehicles?
- b) Which segments of the road transport sector are particularly affected?
- c) Which are the most common forms and methods of theft in the road transport sector and which goods are stolen particularly often?
- d) What are the characteristics of the criminal organisations?
- e) Are there any hot spots in Europe and if so, which counties, regions or areas are particularly affected?

1.2.3 Tackling the problem in the Member States

The second general objective is to make an investigation of the actions of the stakeholders (e.g. shippers, operators, the authorities of the Member States) already take to deal with the problem of theft of cargo and transport vehicles.

1.2.4 Tackling the problem at the EU level

As the problem of organised theft is typically an **international** problem, close cooperation between national authorities when targeting this problem seems to be nearly a prerequisite. Although several supra-national initiatives are already taken, e.g. (by) Europol and Eurojust, a clear overview seems not to be available. Recommendations in this respect to all groups of stakeholders will conclude the study.

1.3 Top of the iceberg

1.3.1 Unclaimed property

After consulting several insurance companies and transport operators it has become clear that there might be a large gap between the property value that is claimed (and therefore forms the basis for the statistics) and the actual value of the property that has been stolen. The reason for this (non-) claiming behaviour may be found in the following:

- Transport operators tend to maintain an 'own risk' value. All property that has been lost and has a value per occasion of less than this own risk value, will not be claimed. Although the actual value of the own risk is related to the risk policy of the individual transport operator, a typical value seems to be about at a maximum €1000 per occasion. The benefit of maintaining a (high) own risk value is that it saves insurance premium.
- Especially in road transport sector in which 'safety' and 'security' are key words and/or part of the management strategy, a transport operator might be cautious to claim all loss of property. The reasoning behind this behaviour might be found in the feared loss of image.

One result of this non-claiming behaviour of transport operators is that the few statistics that are available on total value of stolen cargo and that are based on the claimed loss of property value, will show an underestimate of the real loss of property value. In the next chapter, an attempt is made to estimate the value of non-claimed stolen cargo in the European road freight transport.

1.3.2 Total costs of cargo theft

On top of the direct costs of theft mentioned above, at least two other even less quantifiable costs components must be mentioned. These are the costs of repairing (truck or trailer) damage as a result of the theft and the cost of re-ordering, loss of customer confidence, additional security measures and secondary shipping. The total costs of especially the last category can be very substantial.

1.4 Grouping of countries

Starting from a total number of 27 Member States will mean that several countries will present figures on road freight security that are a nearly complete copy of each other's. It is therefore decided to group the Member States into 10 categories (see also: Annex I). The basis for the determination of these categories are two factors: risk level and (actual road freight transport related) crime fighting.

1.4.1 Risk level

The risk level depends on the actual level of (in)security that is valid for a certain country. This risk level is strongly related to the actual number of transports that are performed in a certain region. It appeared from a recent study¹ that there might be a strong relation between this number of transports and the number of crimes (see also the remark below). In other words, the chance that a transport is being attacked is a percentage of the total number of transports. Recent research shows typical values of about 0,08%² in international transport.

This means in principle that the central countries of Europe rank high on this scale because of a lot of transit trips and the more outlying rank lower. An exception has to be made in this respect for the countries that form the 'main gates' to the rest of the world such as the Europoort (Port of Rotterdam) for deep sea freight transport or Frankfurt International Airport for intercontinental airfreight. On the basis of this methodology the Member States are classified into the categories; High, Medium and Low (see table 1.1).


¹ 'Study on the feasibility of organising a network of secured parking areas for road transport operators on the Trans European Road Network', NEA for DGTREN, 2007.

² This figure is mentioned, amongst others, in a report based on a questionnaire survey among Danish export drivers; AHTS (2002) in co-operation with ITD, STL and SID (et.al).

Remark: Concerning the probability of a relation between number of crimes against road freight transport in a certain region and the actual number of transports that visit this region.

Although the production of hard proof of the existence of a proportional relation between the actual risk level (number of incidents per period) and the number of road freight trips visiting this region was not a goal of the study mentioned in the footnote, after plotting incidents on a map in which also the traffic densities are mentioned, this relation seems to exist. The resulting pattern is shown in figure 1.1a.

Figure 1.1a Main hot spots and number of truck movements per day (trips) in the Member States.



1.4.2 Activity level

Several organisations of shippers and/or transporters have already initiated actions to counteract crimes against road freight transport, such as TAPA-EMEA. Although still fairly limited in number also several national authorities are in one way or another trying to set-up dedicated crime-fighting programs. One of those initiatives is the signing of the so-called Treaty of Prüm (see also Annex II and par. 3.6) to step up cross-border cooperation in the field cross-border crimes.

In the study on secure parking areas (see footnote on page 7), national policy makers were questioned on the fact that initiatives in this field are taken in their respective home countries (see: section 5 of the 'Parsec questionnaire' in Annex A2). Although not all countries responded to this questionnaire, together with all other bits and pieces of relevant information that have become available, the results can be used to fill table 1.2.

Four categories are distinguished: High (activity level), Medium, Low and Missing. The last category comprises the countries of which too little information has become available to base this classification on.

Remark:


Although of fairly qualitative origin this classification factor is believed to be very valuable with respect to the determination of the level of initiatives that a certain Member State is already taking concerning the fight against crimes in road freight transport.

1.4.3 Country groups

Using both determinants, an overview can be defined in which countries with more or less the same values are grouped into 10 categories (three 'risk' categories times three 'activity' categories plus one group with 'missing values'). The results are listed in table 1.1.


When interpreting this table, one has to bear in mind that, on the whole, the availability of relevant information has been fragmentary. However, we consider the broad picture as valid. This picture suggests that the urge to fight against theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle differs per (group of) Member States. When presenting the recommendations, this conclusion has also to be taken into account.

Figure 1.1 Classification of Member States based on the number of trips related risk levels.



Source: NEA

Figure 1.2 Classification of Member States based on the number of initiatives to fight against crimes in road freight transport.



Source: NEA

Table 1.1 Grouping of Member States based on the risk level and contra-theft activities.

	<i>Risk level</i>		
<i>Contra-theft activities</i>	<i>Low</i>	<i>Medium</i>	<i>High</i>
High	Estonia Finland	Austria Denmark Portugal	Belgium
Medium	Czech Republic Lithuania	Italy Poland Slovakia Sweden United Kingdom	The Netherlands
Low	Latvia	Luxembourg Spain	France Germany
Unknown	Cyprus Greece Ireland Malta Slovenia	Bulgaria Hungary Romania	

Source: NEA

1.5 Sources of information

Although time and resources were limited, a lot of information has been obtained. The sources of information can be categorised into several groups:

- Free information available on the Web from sources such as:
 - Eurostat statistics,
 - Reports and papers from specialised organisations like Stratfor Forecasting Inc, Freightwatch Group,
 - Europol
 - Intergroup on Law enforcement, Organised Crime and Terrorism
- Results and data from the Parsec-study¹
- Information from the IIS-database on road freight theft incidents, maintained by the members of TAPA-EMEA,
- A separate questionnaire that has been distributed among shippers and transport operators (see also Annex A1)
- Interviews with key experts from:
 - Shippers and their organisations
 - Transport operators and their organisations
 - (freight) Insurance companies
 - Police authorities (incl. Europol)
 - Data collectors
 - Keepers of facilities

¹ 'Study on the feasibility of organising a network of secured parking areas for road transport operators on the Trans European Road Network', NEA for DGTREN, 2007.

1.6 Structure of the report

The report starts with discussing the remarks the ECMT has made in their report on crimes in road freight transport cumulated. in the presentation of the main objectives of this study.

In chapter one, also grouping of countries is applied in order to be able to present results for all Member States without too much of duplication.

Chapter two presents the statistical background bearing in mind that obtaining relevant data has not been easy. Regular crime rate statistics are virtually unavailable and sometimes they seem only to rely on anecdotal information. Data on, for instance, the type of organisation virtually does not exist.

Notwithstanding these facts, an attempt has been made to estimate the total costs of organised theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle in the European Union.

In chapter three, the current actions of the main stakeholder groups are mentioned.

In the last chapter, the recommendation per main stakeholder group and per country group are presented in a condensed form. This means that the recommendations are defined in a clear and summarised way but without oversimplification of the actions and impact.

The main sources of bibliographical information that are used in this study are listed in Annex C.

Annex E presents a list of current TAPA EMEA members.

The explanation of some important abbreviations is listed in the last Annex.

2 Statistical background

2.1 Data availability

2.1.1 The Parsec project

In the study on secure parking areas,¹ a questionnaire (see Annex A2) was distributed to the EU Member States. Part 1 of the questionnaire contained a number of questions asking about the availability of statistics on criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and cargo.

Only a limited number of countries (8) indicated that they have statistics on crimes related to vehicles, cargo and drivers.

As it turns out, the availability of statistical data is primarily limited to the theft of vehicles. Driver and cargo related crimes (independent from the theft of vehicles are rare) are apparently very difficult to derive from the available crime statistics.

Although a number of countries subsequently produced data on vehicle theft, these data could not always be accepted because it could not be directly interpreted as data related to the theft of tractors/(semi-) trailers/lorries but were mixed with data on small commercial vehicles (vans) or sometimes even with the theft of cars (e.g. in the case of Italy). After a sifting process of such data we were left only with the data from 6 countries that we can consider to be more or less reliable although even in these cases some correction because of non-matching definitions have taken place. In other words; even in the best case, the data is not for 100% reliable. In table 2.1 we list these data.

Table 2.1 Commercial vehicle theft in various countries (theft of trucks >3.5 ton)

	1999	2003	2004	2005
Belgium		236	269	
Czech republic			76	84
Germany			1930	2012
Netherlands	352	349	368	319
Slovenia	150	46	68	68
Sweden		204	258	
United Kingdom			2237	2092

Source: web-search, interviews, questionnaires (mainly section 3 of the 'Parsec questionnaire'; see Annex A2)

¹ 'Study on the feasibility of organising a network of secured parking areas for road transport operators on the Trans European Road Network', NEA for DGTREN, 2007.

It is difficult to extract a trend from such a limited data set. Looking at theft levels in the early 1990's (as reported for example in the study of the ECMT) it appears that the levels in the last 5 years are higher. It must be remarked however, that also the transport performance has grown significantly in the last decade and it is very doubtful that vehicle theft has increased more than proportional.

2.1.2 TAPA EMEA IIS-database

Although several initiatives are taken to solve the problem of missing and/or incomplete information, one initiative is of special interest. This is the so-called TAPA EMEA IIS incident database. This database is maintained by the members of the TAPA EMEA organisation. This organisation was established about ten years ago by large shippers and logistics service providers (forwarders/trucking companies) to support the fight against theft of cargo during transport. More recently, also non-shipper/LSP organisations are allowed to join the organisation as long as the core business of these organisations is in one way or another related to security in freight transport, e.g. insurance companies, police authorities.

The members of this organisation maintain a members only incident database. An incident in this case is a certain criminal act against (road) cargo.

A large part of the background that is shown in the next paragraphs is based on figures derived from this database.

Remark:

Although the number of incidents¹ that is experienced by the members of TAPA is only a fraction of the total number of incidents that happens in the European Union, there is no strong reason to assume that the incident profiles of this fraction are substantially deviating from the same profiles of the population (the population being in this case all relevant incidents). In other words; according to the rules of statistics: the figures of the fraction can be read as estimates for the population.

However, one remark has to be made concerning the country of origin of the TAPA-members; there seems to be an under-representation from memberships from south-eastern Europe. The consequences of this under-representation are not studied in detail but are believed to be fairly limited.

¹ 'Incident' in this study means an occurrence of an organized theft of a commercial vehicle and their load in the European Union.

2.1.3 Other information

Additional to the TAPA EMEA IIS database a questionnaire has been distributed among the stakeholder groups (see also par. 3.1.1). The main results are listed in Annex D.

A short summary of the findings from others sources, is listed in the following table.

Table 2.2 Other relevant findings from various sources

<i>Source</i>	<i>Findings</i>
Study of the ECMT (crime in road freight transport 2002)	Approximately 1% of freight transport vehicles (all commercial vehicles) is stolen every year in some countries. On average, an increase of 21% of thefts was observed in 1995-1999 in 11 countries
Vehicle related crime in Sweden (Transek AB, 2006)	An increase in the number of burglaries in trucks and trailers can be observed in the last year. Theft of vehicles most frequently occurs in the Southern part of Sweden. Crimes are most frequent at lay-bys.
Crime in the high value cargo segment (TAPA 2004/2005)	A total value of US \$80m loss in stolen goods in 2005 was registered (in 2004 this was approx. US \$64m). The number of incidents in 2005 was 308 (423 in 2004). Approximately 16% of the incidents in 2004 occurred at lay-bys.
Survey in Denmark amongst export drivers (AHTS, ITD,DTL,SID et al. 2002)	One in six Danish drivers (of a sample of more than 1800 drivers) experienced a criminal incident in the period 1971-2001). In the last years of the sampled period, the number of incidents numbered on average 40/50 for the group per year. Spain and Italy are high-risk countries and Germany a relatively low-risk country ¹
Survey among operators in the UK (FTA, 2003)	7% of the respondents (UK operators) reported that a driver had been attacked in the last 12 months. This occurred in more than 40% of the cases when parked at the operator's depot
Survey in the Netherlands among road transport operators (TLN, 2004)	76% of the respondents (transport companies) have once or several times experienced a criminal incident at a parking area. This occurred for the (Dutch) operators about as frequently in Germany as in France as in the Netherlands itself

¹ The contradiction between this statement on Germany ('low risk') and the results presented in table 1.1 originates from the fact that the risk level classification criterion is related to the 'number of transports' which is particularly high for Germany. We also like to mention that other sources seem to disagree with the statement that Germany is a low risk country (see also figure 1.1a).

Survey among drivers and operators of ECMT- IRU (2006, still in progress)	Based on information in advance (more than 3000 completed questionnaires): 1 in 6 drivers in international goods transport experienced an attack in the last 5 years. About 42% of the incidents occur in parking areas.
Transport security for goods, vehicles and drivers in the Pan European Transport Corridor IV (Secretariat for the Pan European Transport Corridor IV, 2006)	The security situation in Transport Corridor IV has greatly improved, according to the results of a survey among users in 2004. Attacks on drivers are now a minor problem, risks are no higher than elsewhere in the EU. The probable cause is institutional strengthening, abolishment of customs checkpoints, use of security systems and social/economic improvements.
Vehicle and cargo related crime in the Netherlands (Beke, 2006)	Trends in thefts of commercial vehicles are only slightly increasing and cargo thefts actually decreasing. Surprisingly, many vehicles are stolen without cargo (in almost 50% of the cases vehicles were empty) Direct and indirect damage of the thefts is between 100 million and 500 million Euros.

2.2 Total loss value

The statistic includes all the incidents registered by TAPA EMEA IIS between January 2003 and December 2006, which concerned trucks and truck loads (incl. fraud).

Table 2.3 Total loss value in road freight transport IIS database (average per year based on the period January 2003-December 2006)

<i>Item</i>	<i>number of incidents</i>	<i>average value per incident (*€ thousand)</i>	<i>total value (*€ thousand)</i>
Total value of 'High Loss value' (more than €500.000 per incident)	16	1.701,7	26.800,9
Total value of 'Medium Loss value' (between €150.000 and €500.000 per incident)	42	268,8	11.288,9
Total value of 'Low Loss value' (between €5.000 ¹⁾ and €150.000 per incident)	262	30,7	8.042,8
Total	383	144,2	46.132,5
Reported without loss value known ²⁾	63	-	-


Source: IIS-database; years: 2003-2006: stakeholder questionnaire, interviews

1) €5.000 is believed to be the average value of the 'own risk'. Loss of property below this value will not be claimed at the insurance company

nor be remarked to the IIS database. It is believed that about 20% of this amount are direct costs.

- 2) Part of these incidents may belong to the group of non-declared direct losses of property with a property value of less than € 1000 per occasion (however, because of for instance vehicle damage as result of theft, the actual costs may easily be much higher). (see also remark 1).

Figure 2.1 Graduation of loss value



Source: TAPA EMEA IIS- database

2.3 Yearly direct and indirect damage

2.3.1 Direct and indirect damage

The total direct damage is the actual replacement value of the stolen cargo and/or freight vehicle.

The indirect damage consists of additional costs that result from, for instance, the not in time deliverance of the cargo at the premises of the receiver. In the worst case, this late or non deliverance may interrupt his production process. The cost effects of this kind of interruption are not taken into account. However, some sources estimate that the costs of this indirect damage may easily double the total direct costs.

Remark:

Petty crime, like the theft of the driver's mobile phone, are not taken into account in this report. It is also believed that this kind of crimes is generally not organised but so-called 'opportunity' theft.

2.3.2 Total direct damage

Regarding the remarks in the foregoing paragraphs, it is not surprising that estimating the value of the total direct damage because of theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle has proven not to be easy.

An attempt to determine the total amount has been made on the basis of figures originating from the IIS-database and additional figures from, amongst others, insurance companies.

As stated in chapter 1, the total direct damage costs consist of two categories, namely the declared costs at the insurance companies and the non-declared costs. Likewise, in the costs estimates, an attempt is made to make this distinction.

2.3.3 Method for damage calculation

As the actual number of incidents, thefts of cargo and/or freight vehicle, in the European Union is unknown, an attempt has been made to determine this figure on the basis of number of loaded trips. The starting point of the calculations are the figures on number of loaded trips that are presented by Eurostat (most recent year: 2004).

Secondly, an estimate is made of the chance that the operator of a certain trip will be victim of a theft. A distinction has been made between long distance trips (more than 600 kilometres single trip distance) and short distance trips as the risk percentages seem to differ substantially. A typical value for the chance on a theft in short and medium distance transport seems to be 0,0001 (one theft per 10.000 trips). For long distance road transport this value seems to be twice as high (one theft per 5.000 trips). This value seems to be in line with figures of about 0,0008 for **all** crimes related to international road freight transport which has been mentioned in paragraph 1.4.

Next, the derived number of incidents are multiplied by the share of the three loss value categories that are distinguished by TAPA EMEA. In this way, the total number of incidents per value category is estimated.

The last step is to multiply the retrieved number of incidents per loss value category by the actual average value for a certain category. The source of the average value is again the TAPA EMEA IIS database. Additional information is retrieved from the questionnaire that has been distributed among the stakeholders.

More information on the applied method is presented in Annex III.

2.3.4 Results

Although the estimates are rather rough, the figures presented in table 2.4 show a clear picture of the magnitude of the direct loss of value caused by theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle in the European Union. Bearing in mind that the figures of several Member States are missing, the total loss of value can be estimated at more than €8,2 Billion¹ each year. Of this amount about €450 million is not declared by the transport operators.

¹ This value is in line with the figures received from Stratfor Forecasting Inc. They estimate the worldwide direct merchandise losses caused by cargo theft at \$ 50 billion each year.)

The Dutch Beke reports the total direct and indirect damage of the vehicle thefts is between 100 million and 500 million Euros which is also in line with the presented estimate for the Netherlands.

If the loss value is related to the number of loaded trips, a value of about € 6,72 (loss value divided by number of loaded trips) per trip results.

Remark:

Although the estimates of the total loss value relates to the year 2004, we assume that the values for the more recent years are of the same magnitude.

Table 2.4 Estimated loss value in road freight transport as a result of theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle (basic year: 2004)

<i>EU Member State</i>	<i>Number of loaded trips (figures for the year 2004) (* 1 m)</i>	<i>Claimed theft of cargo and/or vehicle during road transport (* € m)</i>	<i>Total costs of theft of cargo and/or vehicle during road transport (* € m)</i>
Austria	22	139,6	147,9
Belgium	26	164,9	174,8
Bulgaria	missing	missing	missing
Cyprus	3	19,0	20,2
Czech Rep	53	336,2	356,3
Denmark	16	101,5	107,6
Estonia	3	19,0	20,2
Finland	27	171,3	181,5
France	152	964,2	1021,9
Germany	232	1471,6	1559,8
Greece	missing	missing	missing
Hungary	22	139,6	147,9
Ireland	22	139,6	147,9
Italy	92	583,6	618,5
Latvia	7	44,4	47,1
Lithuania	5	31,7	33,6
Luxembourg	3	19,0	20,2
Malta	missing	missing	missing
Netherlands	49	310,8	329,4
Poland	79	501,1	531,1
Portugal	24	152,2	161,4
Romania	missing	missing	missing
Slovakia	25	158,6	168,1
Slovenia	6	38,1	40,3
Spain	144	913,4	968,1
Sweden	21	133,2	141,2
UK	195	1236,9	1311,0
Total EU	1228	7789,5	8256,1

Source: Parsec, Eurostat, IIS-database, stakeholder questionnaire, NEA-cost calculation models

2.4 Affected market segments

In the IIS-database also information is maintained on the commodity that has been stolen. However, when addressing this information one has to bear in mind that the members of the TAPA EMEA-organisation are the main source of information on the incidents. As these members (=shippers and transport operators) tend to be active in the market sectors (high-end) 'business electronics' and 'consumer electronics' there might be a slight overrepresentation of these sectors in the figures of table 2.5. However, as also relevant additional

information has been obtained from the questionnaire, if and when necessary, some slight balancing of the figures has been put through.

Although various electronics show their prominence, the largest category is the non-electronic consumer goods. The value per unit of product may not be as high as in the consumer electronics sector, the ease with which this kind of commodities can be sold at the black market, makes them interesting for being stolen.

Table 2.5 Affected market segments

<i>Product category/ market segment</i>	<i>Share (%)</i>
Non-electronic consumer goods	19
Consumer Electronics	16
Laptops & PDA'S	15
Unspecified	10
Various IT	9
Desktop, Server, Networking	9
Display (Monitor)	5
Mobile Phone	5
Peripheral (Hardware)	4
CPU	2
Supplies	2
Memory, Ram	1
Clothing and Footwear	1
HDD, Storage	1
Food and Beverage	1
Cash/Bullion	0
Pharmaceutical & Medical Products	0
Tobacco Products	0
total (%)	100
total absolute	1530

Source: IIS-database; years: 2003-2006; stakeholder questionnaire, interviews

2.5 Forms and methods of thefts

2.5.1 Location of the theft


In the IIS-database also information is maintained about the location at which the incident (the theft) has taken place. Of all the incidents reported during the period from 2003 till 2006, about 41% of all the incidents has been located during the driving phase of the trip; this means that nearly 60% of all thefts have taken place during a stop. Theft on secure parking areas is fairly limited; however, for more than a quarter of all thefts the non secure parking areas is reported as location. The remaining quarter of the thefts is reported to have taken place at certain facilities that are visited during the trip, e.g. facilities at origin and destination, mode shift facilities (see table 2.6).

Table 2.6 Location of the theft

<i>Location</i>	<i>share (%)</i>
en route	41
secure parking	4
non secure parking	27
facilities	28
total (%)	100
total (abs)	1359

Source: IIS-database; years: 2003-2006; stakeholder questionnaire, interviews

Figure 2.2 Total number of incidents per location



Source: IIS-database

2.5.2 Method of theft

Some information from the IIS-database is available on the method that has been used with the theft. With a share of more than 60% of all reported incidents is theft from the vehicle without further reports on, for instance, threats towards the driver or tearing up of the canvas of the load unit, the most important method. In nearly 15% the vehicle (mostly also with cargo) is stolen. Another 15% and a very worrying kind of method of theft is hijacking and (sometimes even armed) robbery (see table 2.7).

Table 2.7 Method used with the theft

<i>Method</i>	<i>share (%)</i>
theft from vehicle	63
theft of vehicle	14
robbery	8
hijacking	7
other	8
total (%)	100
total (abs)	1530

Source: IIS-database; years: 2003-2006; stakeholder questionnaire, interviews

2.6 Type of organisations

2.6.1 Vast reseller network

Although some initiatives concerning the type of organisations that plans the theft are well under way, a clear picture does not exist. However, the fact that more and more complete truck loads are stolen and seemingly not at random, at least suggests that there exists a large network of resellers of stolen property; a truckload of a few hundred identical flat screen television sets are not easily (re)sold in a local pub.

Also, the fact that such a quantity is stolen means that there is a market for the goods; criminals also want to make a profit.

2.6.2 Changing tactics

Shippers and thieves are caught in a rat race. After experiencing rising levels cargo theft starting about ten years ago, the shippers have responded by re-evaluating their supply and distribution chain. Methods that have been applied are strategic partnerships with forwarders and transport operators, driver background checks and all kinds of security devices and systems installed in the trucks. Drivers are advised on safe behaviour like the use of secure truck stops. The criminal organisations seem to react to these changes with more aggressive methods. They make use of bogus police officers, knockout gas that disables the driver and brute force to enter the vehicle.

2.6.3 OCTA: Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2006

In its OCTA-2006¹ report, Europol states that 'with regard to OC (Organised Crime), one overall conclusion to be drawn is the dynamic relationship between the various indicators employed in the analysis, namely:

- The international dimension;
- Group structures;
- Use of legitimate business structures;
- Specialisation;
- Influence;
- Use of violence;
- Counter-measures'.

Europol also concludes that: 'The main threatening aspects of OC groups are, first, the overwhelming obstacles in dismantling them because of their international dimension or influence and second, their level of infiltration in society and economy.' These statements may lead to the conclusion that, although it is not clear if all organised theft of cargo and/or vehicle is performed by professional criminal organisations, the circumstances under which at least some big hits have taken place, might suggest this.

¹ 'OCTA 2006', 'Executive Summary': p5; Europol

See also for the full text:

<http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/OCTA/OCTA2006.pdf>

2.6.4 Conclusion

Although 'opportunity-thefts' will remain to play a role in the theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle, there are reasons to believe that at least the bigger hits are well organised. It also seems that a substantial part of the thefts is 'on order'.

2.7 Hot Spots

2.7.1 Remarks

The contents of table 2.8 and 2.9 might present a somewhat biased picture concerning the distribution of incidents based on country and region. The reason for this might be found in the membership of TAPA EMEA (an over-representation of Western European-based companies), as the source of information is the IIS-database. A second reason might be found in the fact that in some countries, especially the U.K., the monitoring and registration of traffic incidents in general and of freight incident in particular, seems to be much better organised than in many other Member States. The effect of the latter will be that the countries with better monitoring systems will rank high in the incident statistics. Notwithstanding these remarks, we believe both tables show some clear patterns.

2.7.2 Per Country

The figures of table 2.8 show, as expected, that the large and/or main transit countries are on top of the listing. The conclusion that nearly 30% of all registered incidents have taken place in the U.K. may be partly related to the remarks stated above. Notwithstanding these remarks, the information of the IIS-database seems to point at a serious problem with the safety of cargo and/or freight vehicles in the U.K.

The table also shows that *nearly 90% of all registered incidents* have taken place in the seven largest and/or main transit countries.

Table 2.8 Total number of incidents per country (with Loss Value Graduation)

Country	Number of Incidents	Value category ¹⁾			
		High (more than € 500K ²⁾)	Medium (between 150.000 and € 500.000)	Low (between 5.000 ³⁾ and € 150.000)	Unknown
UK	29% (451)	67% (42)	40% (67)	22% (232)	44% (110)
France	13% (193)	8% (5)	10% (16)	14% (149)	9% (23)
Belgium	10% (153)	2% (1)	7% (12)	8% (83)	23% (57)
Germany	10% (146)	8% (5)	18% (30)	10% (100)	4% (11)
Netherlands	9% (143)	10% (6)	7% (12)	11% (120)	2% (5)
Italy	8% (126)	0% (0)	7% (12)	8% (86)	11% (28)
Spain	8% (125)	2% (1)	5% (8)	10% (107)	4% (9)
Sweden	4% (60)	2% (1)	1% (1)	5% (55)	1% (3)
Czech Rep	1% (14)	0% (0)	1% (1)	1% (13)	0% (0)
Poland	1% (14)	0% (0)	1% (1)	1% (12)	0% (1)
other	7% (105)	3% (2)	5% (8)	9% (92)	1% (3)
total (%)	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
total (abs)	1530	63	168	1049	250

Source: IIS-database; years: 2003-2006: stakeholder questionnaire, interviews

- 1) Value of the stolen property per occasion.
- 2) €K= €1000
- 3) Estimated value (direct + indirect costs) below which the damage is not claimed.

Remark:

The U.K. ranks first during the monitoring period: in the first year (2003) it accounted for 41% of the registered incidents, in 2006 this share dropped to 24%. (see Annex B) Although no hard proof exists, this dramatic drop may be one of the results of strong anti-theft action plans that have been effective in this period. Examples of these action are: Truckpol, a UK national police database and support system making information available to industry; Operation GRAFTON, the police led partnership with government and industry which is very successful in reducing freight crime in the area around London Heathrow.

2.7.3 Per region

A more refined distribution of the location of the incidents is shown in table 2.9. Although several hot-spots can be distinguished, none of them have a share of more than 10%. One conclusion seems to be obvious, densely populated areas are well represented. Examples are: Greater London, Flemish Region (corridor: Brussels-Antwerp), Ile-de-France, Madrid.

Table 2.9 Total number of incidents per region(with Loss Value Graduation)

Region	Country	Number of Incidents	Value category ¹⁾			
			High (above €500 K ²⁾)	Medium (between 150 and €500 K)	Low (between 5 and €150 K)	unknown
Greater London	GBR	9% (133)	22% (14)	15% (26)	6% (60)	13% (33)
West Midlands	GBR	7% (100)	16% (10)	3% (5)	6% (62)	9% (23)
Flemish Region	BEL	6% (98)	2% (1)	5% (8)	5% (57)	13% (32)
South East England	GBR	5% (75)	14% (9)	7% (11)	3% (31)	10% (24)
Île-de-France	FRA	4% (58)	6% (4)	3% (5)	4% (44)	2% (5)
Madrid	ESP	3% (47)	0% (0)	2% (3)	4% (40)	2% (4)
North Rhine-Westphalia	DEU	3% (44)	3% (2)	7% (11)	3% (27)	2% (4)
Lombardy	ITA	3% (42)	0% (0)	3% (5)	3% (32)	2% (5)
North Brabant	NLD	2% (38)	0% (0)	3% (5)	3% (32)	0% (1)
other		58% (895)	37% (23)	52% (89)	63% (664)	47% (119)
total (%)		100%	100%	100%	100	100
total (abs)		1530	63	168	1049	250

source: IIS-database; years: 2003-2006: stakeholder questionnaire, interviews

1) Value of the stolen property per occasion.

2) €K = 1000 €

3 Current actions

3.1 Stakeholders' (re)action

3.1.1 Stakeholders (see also figure 3.1)

The main stakeholders in road freight transport are:

- **Shippers**
The transportation process starts with a transportation request from a shipper. The shipper has a customer for his product and he wants this shipment to be delivered: complete, in time and in good order (= the quality of the delivery).
- **Receivers**
The receiver's (production or retailing) process depends for a substantial part on the quality of the delivery of the shipment. Non-timely delivery may interrupt this process with significant losses for the receiver as a result.
- **Transport operators**
The transporter will be held responsible for the quality of the delivery. Non compliance will result in claims, although maximised by regulations like 'CMR'. However, although insured, this non compliance may harm the good reputation of a transporter. Furthermore, trends in for instance Germany show that the transporter will be held responsible for the **full value** instead of the insured value of the cargo. This value can easily be more than € 1 million per shipment. Especially in the case of small operators, such a claim may cause their business to collapse.
- **Keepers of facilities**
As nearly 60% of all theft of cargo and/or vehicles takes place during the non-driving phases of a trip, the keepers of the facilities have to play a very important role in the transportation process. About 30% of all incidents occurs in parking areas, an other 30% at the facilities of the shippers and receivers, and at mode shift locations (see also table 2.3).¹
- **Insurance companies**
Several national and international obligations exist concerning the insurance of cargo and vehicles. Insurance companies not only provide this type of insurances but also offer advise to their clients on anti-theft programs.²

¹ A good example is the recent (private) initiative is the construction of a secure parking area in the neighbourhood of the port of Rotterdam by the The Maat Group. The Maat Truck Parking main security measures are:

- Area is fenced-off by a power-fence
- 24-hours camera-watch and (remote) guarding
- Optimal lighting of the area
- Optimal positioning of the trucks on the area in case of dangerous or high value cargo
- Card-based area entrance only

² A Dutch insurance company TVM offers courses which can help companies to reduce the risk of becoming a victim of (organised) theft

- (police and governmental) authorities
A typical task for governmental authorities on all levels is the provision of 'safety' and 'security' to their inhabitants and their businesses. The provision of transport safety, e.g. by fighting (organised) theft of cargo and/or vehicles, is therefore also one of their basic tasks.

3.1.2 Actions taken

Several initiatives in fight against organised theft of cargo and/or freight vehicles are already underway. The main actions per stakeholder category are:

- Shippers/ receivers
 - Establishing special property protection organisations like TAPA EMEA to coordinate counter-theft actions.
 - Maintaining incident databases to receive information on for instance the seriousness of the problem and arrive at the broad picture.
 - Defining and practicing the 'Freight Security Requirements (FSR)' and the 'Transport Security Requirements (TSR)'.
- Transport operators
 - Establishing 'one address' for all road freight theft related information.
 - Joining of initiatives like TAPA EMEA.
- Keepers of facilities
 - Providing secure parking areas.
 - Increasing safe standards at premises.
- Insurance companies
 - Promoting security standards and procedures.
 - Advising transport operators on how to implement these procedures in practice.
- Authorities
 - Regional

Several initiatives are starting up to coordinate the fight against organised theft. Both direct action on an occurrence of a theft and getting the broad picture of the organisations behind the theft are the leading aspects of these pilots.¹

- National

As the availability of information is one of the main weak points in the fight against organised theft of cargo and/or vehicles, national initiatives are taken, in certain countries much more elaborate than in others (compare for instance the data collection in the U.K. and in Greece), to improve this situation.

Examples are known of broad initiatives, lead by national governments and later on joined by representatives of all the stakeholders, in fighting crimes in freight transport in general and against theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle in particular. An example is the so-called 'Covenant' in the Netherlands in which, amongst others, a branch-wide action scheme is maintained.

¹ There are two examples of such initiatives. One is in the region of Turnhout, Belgium and the other is in de Southern Regions in the Netherlands. There are close contacts between these initiatives since they cover neighbouring areas on each side of the border between Belgium and the Netherlands.

- The Covenant

As part of an overall Action Plan for fighting back crime in the business environment, an agreement, e.g. 'The Covenant', between the main stakeholders of the road transport sector (see figure 3.1) has been signed. The main targets of this agreement are:

Overall reduction of crimes in the road transport sector by 25% (year 2008 compared with 2004).

Intention: reduction by 10% by 2006.

For reaching this targets a list of action points is defined of which point number two is of special relevance. These action points are:

Better statistics:

1. Improving the quantity and quality of figures on crimes in the road haulage sector in the Netherlands.
Results: better prioritising of counter crime measures (the most effective will be given the highest priority)
2. More secure truck parking areas:
Main elements:
passive security measures: concerning layout of parking areas and trucks themselves.
Active security measures: guarding and patrol, better procedures for drivers and (parking area) operators.
adequate follow-up after incident has happened.
Results: reduction of crime rates in road transport in general and at truck parking areas in particular.
3. Education, prevention and advisory programs:
Results: crime prevention by way of integration of logistics management and security management.
4. Cell Broadcast: (pilot on) targeted warning of truck drivers in the vicinity of the crime scene.
Results: very prompt action in case of a crime against a road transport operator.
5. Model procedure for selection of new employees:
Results: less crime 'from inside'.
6. Promotion of tracking and tracing
Results: higher rate of retrieval of stolen cargo
7. Improving security and security by 'chain views'
Results: less crime by targeting the weakest part(s) of the chain
8. Checklist report on criminal facts
Problem: reports are:
incomplete, missing relevant information,
of low quality, or
completely missing.
Results: better statistics (related to point 1)
9. Addition of a crime prevention paragraph to the existing Trade Marks
Results: improved security (and security)

Figure 3.1 Main stakeholders in the road freight transportation process





Figure 3.2 Participants of the 'Covenant'



1) Translates as: 'Challenging crime in road transport'

3.2 Authorities' attitude towards the problem

3.2.1 Missing data

There seems to be a fairly low level of priority within national governments to fight this problem based on the fact that the magnitude of the problem, being the actual value of the stolen property, is not known. This is especially clear when compared with counter-terrorism actions. The low priority shows by the (limited) level of nationwide actions taken by governments to fight this problem.

3.2.2 Organised crime

The fact that the bulk of the theft seems to be very well organised, makes the need for coordinated counter-action even more necessary. From this point of view, the level of actions comparable with that taken against trafficking of people and smuggling of drugs are entirely defensible.

3.2.3 Substantial losses

From figures collected in this study it appears that the total value of stolen property may add up to an amount of € 8,2 billion per year for the European Union. The total cost of indirect costs, e.g. costs of production process disturbances at the premises of the receiver of the shipped goods, may easily double this amount.

3.2.4 Result

Mainly due to an information gap, the seriousness of the problem seems to be underestimated by policy makers. This causes that nation-wide actions initiated by the national governments and regarding the fight against the theft of property (cargo and/or freight vehicle) in road freight transport seems to have low priority.

3.3 Preventive measures

3.3.1 Underestimate

The underestimate of the negative effect of the problem of stolen property in road freight transport on the (further) economic development of the European Union in general and the Member States in particular, causes a too low level of counter-theft programs. Especially since the theft of cargo is becoming more and more the working area of highly organised international criminal teams, actions to fight this problem have to be of the same magnitude.

3.3.2 National initiatives

As the magnitude of the problem of organized theft cargo and/or freight vehicles especially on an integrated European level is (possibly) largely underestimated, the political interest in fighting this problem on an European scale is too low and consequently, so are the budgets.. Unless there will be an EU support for upgrading the fight against organized theft to an integrated European level, the existing limited budgets allow, at best, only national initiatives.

Although this information is not available from all member States, it seems that actions against organized theft of cargo and/or vehicles in the freight transport sector, are at best started as national initiatives. The reasoning behind this may originate from the fact that decisions about the legal base and about budgets that can be made available for this initiatives are (to some degree) made easier and quicker on a national level than on an international/European level. This does mean that the size of the budgets to counter a certain problem are related to the importance that national politicians attach to (fighting) this problem, which can cause significance differences in the way the initiatives are dealt with.

3.3.3 Europol and Eurojust

Two EU- institutions are particularly relevant in the light of fighting organised theft of cargo and/or vehicles, namely: Europol and Eurojust.

Both institutions are said to form a EU-wide platform on which the Member States can share information on,, amongst other issues, all kinds of fighting crime related actions. In this way, also in the fight against cargo and/or vehicle theft coordinated action can be initiated. As far as we were able to find out little till non is done on this subject within the two organizations yet The main field of expertise of Europol is the collection and distribution of intelligence and of Eurojust, the coordination of the imbedding of certain crime-fighting actions in a legal framework. Unfortunately, this expertise seems not to be used for the fight against organized theft of vehicles and loads. The subject is not on the priority list and it is not seen as an entity itself. If the subject is to be dealt with within Europol, Organized theft could possibly fit in the subject Economic Crime

As every relevant party mentions the problem of missing information in this field, the position of Europol is obvious: coordinate and distribute relevant information. Since at least part of the information should be classified, special attention should be paid to the need for closed user groups or password protected websites. At his point as well we were not able to find out what is done on this subject. The exchange of information seems to take place only at a bilateral level between Member States or just regions of Member States (cross border).

3.3.4 Speed vs. profoundness

The need for information originates mainly from two clearly separated action levels, namely:

- Operational
The operational level is the direct action level in case a certain criminal act becomes apparent. The speed with which information becomes available is of the utmost importance (typically within a matter of minutes).

- Strategic
At the strategic level 'speed' is less important than 'getting the total picture'. The main aim is to fight the network behind the criminal acts.

3.4 Actual practices

During the project, information has become available on several regional initiatives. Having no pretence to be exhaustive, a few general remarks can be made concerning these initiatives:

- Direct action
The majority of the initiatives target crimes by reacting as fast as possible on an apparent theft of a truck (mostly, also including cargo). For this approach a (relatively small) special target force is established and, for cases that crosses the boundaries of the region, some supra-regional 'codes of conduct' are defined. These codes prescribe mainly the procedures to be followed when a certain request for assistance is placed. The parties involved are mainly: the (regional) police office, the transport operators and sometimes an insurance company.
- Intelligence
As most of the cargo and/or truck seems to be stolen 'by order'¹ and the circumstances of the theft, at least, suggest some 'inside information', the criminal act seems to be organised by a (semi-) professional organisation. As direct (re)action only targets a small number of all the people involved in a certain criminal act, and therefore only addresses some 'leaves', a few regional (police) initiatives try to chart the complete criminal organisation (the 'complete tree'). As these criminal organisations seem to be truly international in its literal sense, i.e. between countries, the acts against these organisations have to be of the same dimension. This means that these initiatives are often confronted with the different jurisdictions, jurisdiction being the territory within which power can be exercised.
- Limited duration
Most of the initiatives have budgets that are restricted to a certain period of time. These pilot-like projects have therefore a limited duration with possible negative effects on especially the more strategic elements of the fight against organised theft in road freight transport, such as: the determination of the legal framework and the definition of the supra-regional cooperation procedures.

3.5 Response from authorities

In chapter two, a recent questionnaire that has been sent to the road authorities of the EU Member States is mentioned. Table 3.1 shows some results of this questionnaire (part 1 section 5) in a condensed form.

Only about half of the representatives of the Member States returned the completed questionnaire. However, these figures may represent the overall position of all Member States due to the fact that the country distribution of the respondents shows a more or less balanced geographical coverage of the European Union.

¹ Based on police data

Conclusions (opinions of experts on policies related to security in road freight transport):

- About 40% of the Member State governments see the criminal acts against road freight transport as a serious national problem, nearly 30% do not.
- Nearly half of the governments take initiatives in this field.
- More than 70% maintain no dedicated policy instruments when fighting against criminal acts in road freight transport.
- Only less than 40% has concrete plans to introduce (new) policy instruments in this field.
- Only 15% are conducting pilots to improve road freight transports security.
- About half of the governments facilitate initiatives taken by others such as the private sector.

Table 3.1 Opinion of experts on policies related to security in road freight transport

Item	'yes' (%)	'neutral' (%) ¹⁾	'no' (%)	total	
				%	abs.
'Crime in road freight transport is considered to be a serious problem in our country'	40	33	27	100	14 ²⁾
'The government takes initiatives to increase security in road freight transport'	46	27	27	100	14
'There are policy instruments focused on improving security in the road transport of goods'	29	42	29	100	14
'There are concrete plans to introduce policy instruments on improving security'	38	47	15	100	14
'There are pilot projects aimed at improving security'	15	62	23	100	14
'Government facilitates initiatives to improve security'	46	31	23	100	14

Source: Parsec and stakeholder questionnaires

1) 'Neutral'= no opinion

2) Responding countries: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom.

3.6 Treaty of Prüm

The Treaty of Prüm (also know as 'Schengen III') will speed up and simplify the information exchange between police authorities of the Member States. Its main importance therefore lies in the fight against crimes that cross borders.

The main items of the Treaty are:

- improved exchange of information,
- the provisions of this Convention brought within the legal framework of the European Union,
- to establish the necessary legal and technical conditions for that purpose,
- to supplement this Convention with further agreements, allowing automated searching of data in other appropriate records, in so far as is necessary and reasonable for the purpose of stepping up cross-border cooperation.

In the light of the fight against organized theft of commercial vehicles and their loads it is therefore highly recommended to establish an European Union wide support by signing of the Treaty of Prüm by the other Member States (see Annex II).

4 Recommendations

4.1 Highlights from chapter 1, 2 and 3

Importance of road freight transport

- With a share of about 72% in the total land-based transport of goods is road transport the dominating mode of freight transport in the European Union.
- This dominance implies that each day, measured in money terms, many billions of Euros are moved on, amongst others, the Trans European Road Network ('TEN-R').

Increasing numbers of criminal acts against road freight transport

- There are virtually no official statistics available that are practical to verify this statement because of the missing, incomplete or incomparable data they contain.
- Important source of information: The so-called TAPA EMEA IIS incident database is a 'members only' database which contains data on crimes against freight transport and which is maintained by the members of the TAPA EMEA organisation.
- Looking at theft levels in the early 1990's it appears that the levels in the last 5 years are substantial higher. It must be remarked however, that also the transport performance has grown significantly in the last decade and it is very doubtful that vehicle theft as such has increased more than proportional.

Total loss value

- The total loss of value can be estimated at more than €8,2 billion each year in the European Union. Of this amount about €450 million is not declared by the transport operators and taken as being 'own risk' by them.
- If the total loss value is related to the number of loaded trips, a value of about € 6,72 per trip results.

Characteristics of theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle in the European Union; (mainly based on the TAPA EMEA IIS incident database)

- Of all incidents reported during the period from 2003 till 2006, about 41% of all the incidents has been located somewhere during the driving phase of the trip; this means that nearly 60% of all thefts has taken place during a stop.
- Theft on secure parking areas is fairly limited; however, for more than a quarter of all thefts the non secure parking areas is reported as location.
- The remaining quarter of the thefts is reported to have taken place at certain facilities that are visited during the trip, e.g. facilities at origin and destination or mode shift facilities.
- With a share of more than 60% of all reported incidents is theft from the vehicle without further reports on, for instance, threats towards the driver or tearing up of the canvas of the load unit, the most important method.
- In nearly 15% of the cases the vehicle (mostly also with cargo) is stolen.
- Another 15%, increasing, and a very worrying kind of method of theft is hijacking and (sometimes even armed) robbery.

- However, the fact that more and more complete truck loads are stolen and seemingly not at random, at least suggests that there exists a large network of 'resellers' of stolen property.
- Figures show that the large and/or main transit countries are on top of the listing of hot spots. One further conclusion seems to be obvious, densely populated areas are well represented. Examples are: Greater London, Flemish Region (corridor: Brussels-Antwerp), Ile-de-France, Madrid.
- The above is one of the facts that lead to the assumption that the actual number of crimes is proportional with the number of trips in a certain region.

Counter acts by policy makers

- From the national government point of view there seems to be a fairly low level of priority to fight this problem. This is especially clear when compared with counter-terrorism actions. The low priority shows by the (limited) level of nation wide actions taken by the national governments to fight this problem.
- Europol and Eurojust are said to form EU-wide crime fighting coordination platforms. As far as we were able to find out little till now is done on the issue of organized theft of freight vehicles and their loads.

4.2 Introduction

The recommendations in this chapter will be presented per stakeholder group. The main reason for this is the fact that there are substantial differences in the actions to be taken by each of these groups. With this presentation also the country groups will be taken into account if and when applicable. The recommendations will be listed with a short description of the background.

4.3 Recommendations to: Shippers

4.3.1 Need for a powerful anti-theft shippers' organisation.

Since every shipper is confronted with organised theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle, shippers should organise themselves (more strongly) in this field. Although several shippers' organisations already (like CLECAT) it seems that additional effort is needed to fight the growing problem of organised theft. An example of such an organisation is TAPA-EMEA which has the potential to play this role. However, for the time being it is still too much oriented on 'Western European' affairs.

- Relation to country groups

As several initiatives are already taken in Western Europe, special effort should be put in this field in the countries that have fairly high risk levels (levels: 'medium' and 'high') and that lie outside Western Europe. It is therefore highly recommended to upgrade activities in this field especially in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Spain, Slovakia and Poland.

4.3.2 Provision of security procedures in the supply chain

It seems that every large(r) shipping company invests a lot of resources in setting up procedures within the company to arrive at higher security levels. As this means a lot of 'reinventing of all kinds of variants of the same wheel', a coordinated approach would not only save time and resources of the shipping sector but also prevent non-matching procedures between shippers. An example may again be the initiatives taken in this field by TAPA-EMEA with its Transport Security Requirements (TSR) and its Freight Security Requirements (FSR).

- Relation to country groups

As these procedures have a strong supranational working, all Member States have to be addressed in this respect. Of course the level of benefits of these procedures is proportional to the risk level of a certain country. This means that such procedures are especially important for Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Germany.

4.3.3 Supply chain approach: mapping chains, finding weak points

Although the premises of the shipper are normally only the starting point of a supply chain, it is in his interest that the cargo is delivered at the premises of the receiver (the client) in time and in good order. If something is wrong in this respect he has to solve the problem immediately, otherwise he may lose his client.

This means that it is also in the interest of the shipper that he has (at least some) influence on the security levels in the chain as a whole. This process starts with a detailed mapping of a certain chain, is followed by defining the weakest chain-element(s), and is terminated by adequate actions and measuring results.

- Relation to country groups

When addressing supply chains, one has to discriminate between short supply chains and long supply chains. The dimensions of the latter can easily be supra-continental.

- Short chains

Short supply chains relate mostly to inland transport or to a few neighbouring countries and is therefore more easily mapped. Although short chains are found all over Europe, they are mostly concentrated in large metropolitan areas. As there seems to be a strong relation between the concentration of short chains and crime rates, more densely populated areas should be addressed especially when fighting against organised theft. Examples of such large areas with substantial crime rates can be found in the U.K. ('Greater London', West Midlands), France (Greater Paris), Spain (Madrid area), Belgium (Antwerp-Brussels Region), Germany (Ruhr-area) and the Netherlands (Rotterdam-Venlo area).

- Long chains

Long chains are typically supranational and often even supra-continental. Mapping such chains is much more challenging than securing them, Although in

this respect, all Member States have to be addressed the countries that are part of these long supply chains, being origin, destination or transit, have a more than average role to play. These countries are especially Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Germany. In the near future, after the realisation of the expected growth in freight volume (in east-west traffic: between 2006 and 2016 a growth of about 30%), also the countries on the main transport corridors e.g. Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Poland.

4.3.4 Supplying of secure parking areas

All too often it happens that a loaded freight vehicle is too late or too early at the unloading area. It even happens that such a vehicle has to be parked for the weekend at a location that is completely unsuitable for this purpose with all its security risks. As nearly 10% of all thefts take place in these circumstances, the provision of secure parking facilities by the shippers (receivers) may help to solve this serious problem.

However, the implementation of third party parking facilities raises the question on responsibility for the parked vehicle and its cargo. (see also below: 'transport operators' and 'keepers of facilities')

- Relation to country groups

As this problem addresses mainly the countries of origin and destination of the cargo, especially shippers in these countries should provide secure parking. In particular the U.K., Germany, France, Poland and Hungary have to be mentioned in this respect.

Remark: in the U.K. and Hungary legal regulations already exist governing the provision of parking areas by shippers.

4.4 Recommendations to: Transport operators

4.4.1 Prevention of information leaks

The circumstances of some (major) theft incidents at least suggest that the robbers have known beforehand what freight vehicle to attack. If this is the case, one might assume that crucial information is leaked from the shipper's headquarters. Themselves although it seems difficult to fight this misbehaviour of employees, several procedures can be implemented to counter it, such as:

- Track record evaluation: new employees should be screened before being granted access to classified information such as cargo specifications. Especially in high risk transport submarkets, a special central register with verified track record information on employees, drivers, planners, etc. might be an option. This information may either be positive in the case of proven professional attitude, or negative in the case of the employee having been convicted of relevant crime already.

- Waiting period: new employees are not allowed to transport easy marketable¹ cargo within a certain period of time, for instance half a year, from the start of the new job.
- Classifying information: although not always an option, distribute (cargo) information only to the employees for whom it is essential to have it. All others, including drivers, should be excluded from the access to this information. The less the employees know the less they can tell, sometimes even without being aware of, to the wrong people.

4.4.2 Use of adequate equipment

It is quite amazing to observe that even very marketable cargo is shipped in ordinary taut liner trucks with cargo units made of cloth that are easily opened even only with a sharp knife. Aluminium body work or bodies made of composite material may discourage robbers enough to spare one's truck.

- Relation to country groups
Although the illegal opening of cargo units, for instance by cutting them open, is not restricted to a certain group of countries, there seems to be a relation between such a crime happening and the poor lighting of the location where it happens. Poorly lit locations are commonly found at the more remote areas especially those that are away from the main transport corridors.

4.4.3 Supplying secure parking areas

The majority of the (larger) transport operators maintain parking areas (mostly secured by fencing and cameras) mainly for parking their own freight vehicles during weekends and public holidays.

Although opening these facilities would partly solve the issue of secure parking, mostly these facilities are not open to be used by third parties. The main reason for this reluctance to open the facilities for third parties is the fact that several examples have become known to the sector of large claims to the provider of such a parking facility in cases where the cargo was reported stolen.

- Conclusion

The implementation of third party parking facilities by transport operators is bound to open a dispute on the responsibility for the parked vehicle and its cargo.

4.5 Recommendations to: Insurance companies

4.5.1 Coordinating the collection of data

The insurance companies open a document file of every theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle. In this file all the relevant information is maintained not only on

¹ Marketable in this study means: easily sold on the black market.

the circumstances of the theft itself but also on the follow-up actions that have been taken and finally on how the case has been closed.

When grouped together these data files may provide valuable information on, for instance, crime patterns appearing in certain areas or concerning certain types of cargo. However, this information has to be kept classified because otherwise also the criminal organisations will make use of it in their attempt to counteract the effects of anti-theft actions.

- Relation to country groups

Although the availability of (practical) data seems to be a shared problem in all Member States, several countries have to be mentioned in particular. Nearly no relevant information seems to be available from: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Malta and Slovenia. There exist serious doubts on the quality of the data that is available from the other Member States. One exception seems to have to be made for the U.K. This exception, however, comes with a serious disadvantage namely: the more thoroughly a country registers its crimes, the higher its crime rate will be in the (European) statistics.

4.5.2 Promoting anti-theft procedures

As insurance companies have a lot of knowledge on the weak spots in the transport chain, they are able to define methods and procedures to strengthen these spots. These methods can be of a technical nature, such as the mounting of tracking and tracing devices on the truck, or of a procedural nature such as simple key-procedures describing the process for key acquisition and return.

- Relation to country groups

The procedures an insurance company promotes should relate to the country groups as pictured in table 1.1. The more up-left a country is located in this table, the less action seems to be necessary. Therefore, insurance companies should pay much more attention in this respect to the following countries: The Netherlands, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

4.6 Recommendations to: Keepers of facilities

4.6.1 Parking fees and willingness to pay

- Parking fees

As we also have seen in figure 1.1a there seems to be a relation between the number of trips in certain region, the population densities of this area and the number of incidents. In other words; the higher the number of trips, the higher also the demand for (secure) parking areas will be. As is clearly shown in the Parsec-study¹, there is also a strong relation between the actual parking fee to be paid by the user (= the transport operator), the security level of the parking

¹ Final report; 'Study on the feasibility of organising a network of secured parking areas for road transport operators on the Trans European Road Network', Rijswijk, Januari 2007, par. 8.3.

area and the population density of a certain region. The relation says: the higher the population density (and therefore the cost of acquiring territory) and the higher the security level, the higher the cost per hour are and thus the higher the parking tariff per hour will be. The calculated costs per hour ranges from about €1 per hour for large parking areas with about 1.000 parking slots located at regions with low population densities (and therefore low land prices), to more than €4 per hour for guarded, relatively small (upto 100 parking slots) parking areas in high density regions.

- Willingness to pay

As profit margins are low, the willingness to pay for parking at a secure parking area has its upper boundaries. From the Parsec-study¹ it has become clear that there is a strong relation between the value of the cargo and the willingness to pay for secure parking. The upper limits of the fees, the security level of the parking area are shown below in relation with the average value per kilogram of the cargo.

Table 4.1 Willingness to pay and security level

<i>security level</i>	<i>upper limit of the parking fee</i>
High (fenced, guarded, entry/exit control)	€4 per hour
Medium (fenced, remotely guarded)	€2 per hour
Low (fenced)	€1 per hour
Public (basic secure)	no fee

Source: Parsec-study

4.6.2 Supplying parking areas

The majority of the keepers of facilities at ports and railway stations. provide services related to transshipment. All too often it happens that a loaded freight vehicle is too late or too early at the transshipment point. As nearly 30% of all thefts take place at these transshipment points the provision of secure parking facilities by the keepers of the transshipment facilities may help to solve this serious problem. However, the dispute over the responsibility for the parked vehicle and its cargo that is likely to arise has to be settled.

- Relation to country groups

As this problem addresses mainly the transit countries, especially the keepers of transshipment facilities in these countries should provide secure parking. In particular the Netherlands, Belgium, (the north of) Germany, (the west of) France have to be mentioned in this respect.

4.6.3 Balanced Supply of secure parking areas

As the security level of parking areas can be differ from one another, the suppliers of these areas have to be well aware of the security level that would be regarded as optimal in this case. Simple economics prevents optimum security

¹ Final report; :Study on the feasibility of organising a network of secured parking areas for road transport operators on the Trans European Road Network', Rijswijk, Januari 2007, par. 8.2.

from drawing level with maximum security standards. As the actual rate for stay at a parking area is proportional to its security levels (in a subsidy-less environment), transport operators have a strong upper limit on what they are willing to pay.

4.7 Recommendations to: Authorities

4.7.1 Coordinated actions

Before this recommendation can be stated, concerning the stakeholder group 'authorities' a more detailed classification has to be made. This closer classification relates to different levels of operation: regional, national and supranational. Next to this classification a distinction has to be made between policy makers and policy keepers such as the police authorities.

- **Coordinating actions**
Policy makers: forming of a juridical framework
Organised crime in general and organised theft of cargo and/or freight vehicles seems to have an ever increasing international dimension. Until fairly recently, the fight against both types of crime was nearly entirely up to the Member States themselves without much coordination among them. However, to facilitate the fight against organised crime a few years ago the Eurojust organisation was created. The main aim of this organisation is the provision of a certain platform on which actions could be coordinated from a jurisdictional point of view so that a common legal framework is achieved. However, it is believed that this organisation should speed-up activities and become more visible to the public. One task for Eurojust that seems to be of current interest is the coordination of the follow-up actions (the juridical framework) after a case is solved and the criminals have been brought before court. It seems that the knowledge on road freight related issues of the majority of the prosecutors is below standard.
- **The Treaty of Prüm: action plan**
With the signing of this treaty several countries, e.g. Germany, France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Spain, Austria and the Netherlands, are going to upgrade their cooperation in the field of crime prevention. A further increase of the number of Member States will strengthen the effectiveness of the action plan of the Treaty dramatically.
- **Conclusion**
Notwithstanding the above facts, at this moment the strength of these initiatives seems to be no match for the larger international criminal organisations. This means that additional effort seems to be in place. This can also be concluded when considering the estimated costs of more than 8 billion for the European Union per year of organised theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle.
- **Policy keepers: the action level**

After the report of a theft in progress several actions have to be taken by the policy-keepers:

- Regional level

Direct intervention team ('task force') springs into action to try to capture the criminals red-handed. Only some examples of such task forces seem to exist, their time and financial resources are limited.

- National level

Normally, the criminal act does not stay within the limits of a certain jurisdiction. A back-up on national level is therefore a prerequisite.

- Supra-national level

As organised theft of vehicle seems to become more and more international, the fight against this type of crime should also go international.

- Conclusion

Although there exists an organisation that is dedicated to the fight against international (organised) crime - Europol, its main mission is 'intelligence' and not coordination of actions. From this point of view such an organisation seems to be missing.

Furthermore, Europol should coordinate the founding and actively promote its use to for instance insurance companies and police authorities, of a blue-print of the data to be collected in a case of organised theft of cargo and/or freight vehicle.

4.7.2 Define parking areas as a part of the infra-structure

More than 30% of all thefts of cargo and/or freight vehicles take place in parking areas. As secured parking areas tend to have much lower crime figures, the establishment of more such areas should be promoted. However, a recent study (Parsec-study) shows that by far the largest demand relates to ordinary parking areas with a basic security level and which are free of charge. The demand for highly secured and therefore fairly expensive 'freight forts', seems to be quite limited. An exception however, have to be made for certain regions with high population densities. Concerning the height of the parking tariffs in these regions; a subsidy (for instance on acquiring territory for this purpose) may lower the parking fees in these areas to a more acceptable level.

However, the construction of parking areas in many Member States is not seen as an essential part of the infrastructure. It is believed that if parking facilities with a basic security level, with simple elements like optimal lighting, are defined as part of the infrastructure, several problems concerning parking capacity will be solved. As the Commission, with the back-up of the ECMT, actively promotes the completion of the Trans European Road Network (TERN) a further benefit of the free movement of road freight would be to define parking facilities as essential part of the infrastructure.

4.7.3 Defining the TERN as secure transport corridors

More than 40% of the incidents of organised theft of cargo and/or vehicles takes place 'en route'¹. The provision of ample secure parking areas will therefore not solve the entire problem of organised theft of cargo and/or freight vehicles. It is therefore believed that the Commission should obtain an integral view on road freight security by defining secure transport corridors. As the Commission is actively promoting the free movement of goods by way of the completion of the TERN, it is believed that the Commission should also promote the transport security along these corridors because insecurity will hinder this free movement.

4.7.4 Dedicating ample resources

Theft of cargo and/or freight vehicles caused a loss of more than 8 billion euro per year for the European Union. The action taken seems to bear no relation to this enormous amount of money. The actions that are needed relate to all authority levels.

¹ 'En route' means in this study: during the trip and the freight vehicle not being parked at facilities or dedicated (truck) parking areas. A stop at a truckers' pub for a cup of coffee therefore belongs to 'en route'.

Annex I Country grouping

- Introduction

Although organised theft of commercial vehicles and their loads in every country of the European Union has to be addressed, it is decided to cluster the Member States into a limited number of country groups ('10'). The reasoning behind this grouping is mainly the fact that there might be a strong overlap and doubling of information if all member States are addressed separately.

- Method

Step 1: definition of crucial factors

In order to be able to cluster the Member States into a limited number of country groups, a decision has to be made on the, in this case, two classification factors being risk level and activity level. These factors should:

- a) have a crucial relation with respect to organised theft,
- b) (in this study with limited time and resources) be available from past research,
- c) be as quantitative ('numbers') and objective ('figures' instead of 'opinions') as possible,
- d) be collectable from multiple sources in order to be able to crosscheck the findings,
- e) be simple concerning definition and interpretation,
- f) contain a limited number of well-defined categories,
- g) address different elements of the object of study (being: organised theft).

Step 2: collection of the value of the factors per Member State

After completion of the definition of the clustering factors, data have to be collected on the actual value of these factors for a certain Member State. Plotting the values for the two classification factors in a table, provides some first information on the validity of these factors to discriminate between the member States and to group the countries on similarities. If it shows for instance that more than half of the Member States fall into one cell, the discriminating effect of one or both factors is not satisfactory.

Remark: A cell is a certain combination of the values of the classification factors; for instance cell(3,1): value of the first classification factor equals '3' and the second equals '1'.

Step 3: evaluation of the results of the clustering

After the clustering is completed, the validity of the clustering can be evaluated by simply looking at the results, e.g. the Member States that are grouped together into a single cell. If the results appeal to one's common sense ('the experts opinion') and to other pieces of relevant information that might be available, the clustering has proven its practicality.

- Results

By clustering the Member States into coherent country groups time and resources might be saved in for instance policy making; instead of a number of '27', a number of in this case '10' have to be addressed. Another benefit of the clustering might be found in the exchange information and best practices between the countries belonging to a certain country group. A last benefit might be found in the field of the exchange of information between country groups. As the values of classification factors range from 'low' to 'high', some country groups have already obtained more practice and better results than some other groups.

Annex II Treaty of Prüm

Convention between:

the Kingdom of Belgium,
the Federal Republic of Germany,
the Kingdom of Spain,
the French Republic,
the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg,
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and
the Republic of Austria

on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration.

The High Contracting Parties to this Convention, being Member States of the European Union,

Considering that in an area with free movement of persons it is important for Member States of the European Union to step up their cooperation, in order to combat terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration more effectively,

Endeavoring, without prejudice to the provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, for the further development of European cooperation, to play a pioneering role in establishing the highest possible standard of cooperation, especially by means of improved exchange of information, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, while leaving participation in such cooperation open to all other Member States of the European Union,

Seeking to have the provisions of this Convention brought within the legal framework of the European Union, in order to improve exchange of information within the European Union, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration, and to establish the necessary legal and technical conditions for that purpose, In observance of the fundamental rights deriving from the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the constitutional traditions common to the States concerned, particularly in the awareness that the supply of personal data to another Contracting Party requires a reasonable standard of data protection on the part of the receiving Contracting Party,

Considering that, without prejudice to current national law, provision should be made for measures under this Convention to remain subject to suitable judicial review,

Seeking to supplement this Convention with further agreements, allowing automated searching of data in other appropriate records, in so far as is necessary and reasonable for the purpose of stepping up cross-border cooperation.

For the full text, see:

[Http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st10/st10900.en05.pdf](http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st10/st10900.en05.pdf)

Annex III Calculation methodology

- Problems related to the collection of relevant data
 - a) Only relevant data available that seems to be very fragmentary, incomplete, doubtful or complete unreliable.
 - b) The main stakeholders are somewhat reluctant to produce additional data, possibly as a result of their serious doubts on the quality and/or completeness of this data or because of the felt sensitiveness of the subject especially concerning the theft of cargo.
 - c) In most Member States the fight against organised theft of cargo and/or freight vehicles seems to be not of high political priority. This may result in for instance limited budgets for the collection of reliable data.

- Assumptions

- a) The number of organised thefts of cargo and/or freight vehicles in a certain region is positively related to the number of loaded trips that pass this region. Thus, the more loaded trips in a certain region the higher the number of thefts will be.

Background:

When lists of hot spots¹ are combined with figures on the number loaded trips in a certain area, there seems to be a strong positive relation. However, limited resources have prevented an indepth study of this relation.

- b) The chance of being victim of an incident in long distance haulage (> more than 600 kilometers single trip distance) is twice as high as in short distance haulage. The chance in long distance haulage is determined at 0,0002 (one organised theft per 5000 loaded trips).

Background:

A travelling distance of about 600 kilometers is the maximum length of a single trip without the need for a night rest. As TAPA IIS figures show (see table 2.6) a strong relation between incidents and non-driving phases of the trip, it is believed that this difference is justified.

- c) The loss value per incident that is retrieved from TAPA EMEA IIS is valid as an estimate for the loss values of all relevant incidents in the Member States (see table 2.3). The loss value classification is therefore also practical for estimating the total loss value for the European Union.

Background:

Although there is an over-representation of TAPA-members originating from Western Europe, and thus of reported incidents, there is no reason to assume that the (average) actual value of the cargo and/or freight vehicles that is stolen for all Europe, is much higher (or lower).

- Method

Step 1: Retrieval of the number of loaded trips per Member State.

Approach: the collection of relevant data from Eurostat.

Results: a table of number of loaded trips per Member State.

Source of information: Eurostat (most recent year: 2004)

Step 2: Determination of the chance on an incident.

¹ Hot spot= location of multiple incidents

Approach:

- Interviews with stakeholders.
- Desk research.

Results: chance factors for short distance and long distance haulage.

Source of information: (interviews with) stakeholders (main source)

Step 3: Determination of the balance between short and long distance haulage

Approach: grouping of trips on base of trip length information.

Results: a table on the number of short distance and long distance trips.

Source: Ten Stac study

Step 4: Determination of the number of incidents per value category.

Approach: grouping the number of relevant incidents into three loss value classes.

Results: a table on the number of relevant incidents per loss value class per Member State.

Source of information: TAPA EMEA IIS database,

Step 5: Determination of the total loss value of the relevant incidents.

Approach: multiplying the number of relevant incidents per loss value class by the average loss value per loss value class.

Results: the total loss value per Member State.

Source of information: TAPA EMEA IIS database.


Step 6: Cross check of retrieved loss values:

Approach: cross checking of the retrieved loss values with relevant information from other sources.

Results: a validated overview on loss values.

Source of information: interviews, desk research and web search.

Figure III.1 Method of determining the total loss value per Member State



Annex A Questionnaires¹

¹ The stakeholder questionnaire has been transformed into an internet-based interactive questionnaire.

A.1 Stake-holder questionnaire



STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONNAIRE

'ORGANISED THEFT OF COMMERCIAL VEHICLES AND THEIR LOADS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION'

Rijswijk, January 2007

Questionnaire for TAPA-members

Reference ENQ(1)/30599000/AEN/GJO

Introduction

On behalf of DG-IPOL¹, NEA Transport research and training and partners are conducting a study on organised theft of commercial vehicles and their loads in the European Union.

One of the objectives of the study is to get an insight into the nature and extent of this type of crime.

Another objective is to gain insight in the way parties (e.g. authorities, shippers and haulers organisations, etc) already act against (organised) theft of cargo and/or vehicles. The results of this enquiry will contribute to the last and main objective of the study which is to arrive at practical recommendations for policymakers and market stakeholders aimed at facilitating the fight against organised theft of cargo and/or vehicles in the EU.

Objective of this questionnaire

This questionnaire will be sent to relevant parties in the EU27 countries in order to get an insight into:

- o the level and development of organised theft of cargo and vehicles in Europe
- o the actions already taken in the 27 countries

Returning the questionnaire and further information

Name & contact details NEA or partner

Contact

details

Name responding person	
Name of organisation	
Telephone	
Email	
Country	

¹ DG-IPOL: Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union

1d. Total number of lost loads					
<i>If not known, please give an estimate, otherwise go to 1e</i>					
These are figures for (please tick):	<input type="checkbox"/> my country	2005		2006	
	<input type="checkbox"/> my company	Total	%	Total	%
	<input type="checkbox"/> other:	number	recovered	number	recovered
-	Cash and/or precious metals
-	Finished products of high value per unit
-	Finished products of medium to low value per unit
-	Raw materials, ores, and other base products
-	Other
	Total
Source of information: -----					

1e. Organised theft of loads					
<i>Please estimate the percentage of <u>organised thefts</u> in relation to the total number of cargo thefts</i>					
These are figures for (please tick):	<input type="checkbox"/> my country	2003	2004	2005	2006
	<input type="checkbox"/> my company				
	<input type="checkbox"/> other:				
-	Cash and/or precious metals
-	Finished products of high value per unit
-	Finished products of medium to low value per unit
-	Raw materials, ores, and other base products
-	Other
	Total
Source of information: -----					

PART 2 Nature and extent of (organised) theft of commercial vehicles

2a. Theft of commercial vehicles

Please estimate the number and recovery-rate in relation to the total number of vehicle thefts

These are figures for (please tick):	2005		2006	
	Total number	% recovered	Total number	% recovered
<input type="checkbox"/> my country				
<input type="checkbox"/> my company				
<input type="checkbox"/> other:				
- (nearly) New heavy duty vehicle
- (nearly) New light or medium duty vehicle
- Dated model heavy duty vehicle
- Dated model light or medium duty vehicle
- Other
Total
Source of information:				

2b. Average value of lost commercial vehicles

Based on figures from the year:

If not known, please give an estimate, otherwise go to 2c

These are figures for (please tick):	Total value of lost vehicles per occasion (times €1000)	Share of total thefts
<input type="checkbox"/> my country		
<input type="checkbox"/> my company		
<input type="checkbox"/> other:		
- (nearly) New heavy duty vehicle %
- (nearly) New light or medium duty vehicle %
- Dated model heavy duty vehicle %
- Dated model light or medium duty vehicle %
Total		100%
Source of information:		

2c. Organised theft of commercial vehicles					
<i>Please estimate the percentage of organised thefts in relation to the total number of vehicle thefts</i>					
These are figures for (please tick):	<input type="checkbox"/> my country	2003	2004	2005	2006
	<input type="checkbox"/> my company				
	<input type="checkbox"/> other:				
- (nearly) New heavy duty vehicle	
- (nearly) New light or medium duty vehicle	
- Dated model heavy duty vehicle	
- Dated model light or medium duty vehicle	
- Other	
Total	
Source of information: -----					

PART 3 Most common forms and methods of theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles

3a. Location of theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles				
<i>Please tick the numbers at the appropriate answers and concern only major thefts</i>				
These are figures for (please tick):	0 my country	2005		2006
	0 my company			
	0 other:			
		organi sed')	not- organi sed	organi sed
				not- organise d
- Theft at loading or unloading area	
- Theft during driving time	
- Theft while parked in parking area during long (night) rest	
- Theft while parked in parking area during short rest (coffee break)	
- Other -----	
Total	
Source of information: -----				

) 'Organised'= the circumstances of the crime suggests that the theft was well-planned and that the robbers know exactly what they had to pick.

3b. Form and method of theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles			
<i>Please tick the appropriate answers and concern only major thefts</i>			
These are figures for (please tick):	0 my country	2005	2006
	0 my company		
	0 other:		
- Hold-up or hijacking during driving time	
- Hold-up or hijacking while parked in parking area during long (night) rest			
- Goods delivered at bogus drop point	
- Burglary while parked in parking area during long (night) rest	
- Burglary while parked in parking area during short rest (coffee break)	
- Other -----	
Total	
Source of information: -----			

PART 4 Measures to tackle theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles

<p>4a. Measures already taken to tackle theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles</p> <p><i>Please tick the appropriate answers considering only major thefts</i></p>				
	my company	my organisation	my countries authorities	other:
- Special security training for drivers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
- Special security procedures for the company	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
- Maintaining of lists of hot spots/ no go areas	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
- Track record verification of new employees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
- Analysis of relevant past crimes and adoption of procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
- Other ----- -----	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Source of information:				

<p>4b. Measures that should be (but are not yet) taken to tackle theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles</p> <p><i>Please tick the appropriate answers and concern only major thefts</i></p>				
	my company	my organisation	my countries authorities	other:
- Special security training for drivers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
- Special security procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
- Maintaining of lists of hot spots/ no go areas	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
- Analysis of relevant past crimes and adoption of procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
- Other ----- -----	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Total
Source of information:				

Thank you for your cooperation!

If you have any remarks, additions and/or other sources of relevant information, you are kindly requested to inform the project team.

A.2 Parsec-questionnaire

(PARSEC) QUESTIONNAIRE

'CRIME AGAINST THE EUROPEAN ROAD GOODS TRANSPORT IN RELATION TO (SECURED) PARKING AREAS'

Introduction

On behalf of DG-TREN, NEA Transport research and training and partners are conducting a study on crime against goods road transport in parking areas along the European TEN-T road network.

One of the objectives of the study is to get an insight into the extent of crime in parking areas. Furthermore in the study insight will be necessary in the legal and financial framework conditions regarding truck parking security. The results of this enquiry will contribute to the main objective of the study which is to arrive at practical recommendations for policymakers and market stakeholders aimed at facilitating the realisation of secured parking areas in the EU.

Objective of this questionnaire

This questionnaire will be sent to relevant authorities in the EU25 countries, Bulgaria and Romania in order to get an insight into:

- o the level and development of crime against the road transport of goods in parking areas in Europe
- o the provision of (secured) parking areas in the 27 countries
- o the legal and financial framework governing the construction and exploitation of (secured) parking areas.

Returning the questionnaire and further information

Name & contact details NEA or partner

1 Contact details

Name responding person	
Name of organisation	
Telephone	
Email	
Country	

PART 1 Criminal acts against the road goods transport in parking areas

Definition

Focus points of this study are all criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and/or cargo in parking areas along the European TEN-T road network (TERN).

2 Availability of statistical information on frequency, type and location of criminal acts against the road goods transport in your country.

Frequency			
2a.	Is (statistical) information available on the total number of criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and/or cargo?	Yes	No, go to 3
2b.	Is (statistical) information available on the total number of criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and/or cargo that take place <u>in parking areas along the TERN?</u>	Yes, go to 2c	No, go to 2d
2c.	What is the percentage of criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and/or cargo that take place in parking areas along the TERN in relation to the total number?%	
2d.	Could you give an <u>ESTIMATE</u> of the percentage of criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and/or cargo that take place in parking areas along the TERN in relation to the total number?%	
Type of criminal acts			
2e.	Is (statistical) information available on the frequency of criminal acts that 'only' involved robbery/theft etcetera of drivers (driver = victim)?	Yes	No
2f.	Is (statistical) information available on the frequency of criminal acts that 'only' involved robbery/theft etcetera of drivers <u>in parking areas along the TERN?</u>	Yes	No
2g.	Is (statistical) information available on the frequency of criminal acts involving the <u>theft of vehicles</u> (tractors/(semi-)trailers/lorries)?	Yes	No
2h.	Is (statistical) information available on the frequency of criminal acts involving the <u>theft of vehicles (tractors/(semi-)trailers/lorries) in parking areas along the TERN?</u>	Yes	No
2i.	Is (statistical) information available on the frequency of criminal acts involving the <u>theft of cargo?</u>	Yes	No
2j.	Is (statistical) information available on the frequency of criminal acts involving the <u>theft of cargo in parking areas along the TERN?</u>	Yes	No

3 Statistics on criminal acts against the road transport of goods

If information on criminal acts against the road transport of goods is available please fill in the following tables. If you do not know the number of incidents that took place in parking areas, could you give an estimate of the percentage of the total number?

3a Please indicate the total number of criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and/or cargo

1995	2000	2003	2004	2005

3b Please indicate the total number of criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and/or cargo in parking areas along the TERN

1995	2000	2003	2004	2005

3c Please indicate the number of criminal acts against drivers

1995	2000	2003	2004	2005

3d Please indicate the number of criminal acts against drivers in parking areas along the TERN

1995	2000	2003	2004	2005

3e Please indicate the number of criminal acts involving the theft of vehicles

1995	2000	2003	2004	2005

3f Please indicate the number of criminal acts involving the theft of vehicles in parking areas along the TERN

1995	2000	2003	2004	2005

3g Please indicate the number of criminal acts involving the theft of cargo

1995	2000	2003	2004	2005

3h Please indicate the number of criminal acts involving the theft of cargo in parking areas along the TERN

1995	2000	2003	2004	2005

4 Trends in criminal acts against the road transport of goods

Please indicate your opinion regarding the trend in criminal acts against the road transport of goods over the last five years in your country (++ = considerable growth, + = moderate growth, 0 = neutral, - moderate decrease, -- = sharp decrease)

Type of criminal act and location	Trend (++, +, 0, -, --)
4a. Criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and/or cargo	
4b. Criminal acts against drivers, vehicles and/or cargo in parking areas along the TERN	
4c. Criminal acts against drivers	
4d. Criminal acts against drivers in parking areas along the TERN	
4e. Criminal acts involving the theft of vehicles	
4f. Criminal acts involving the theft of vehicles in parking areas along the TERN	
4g. Criminal acts involving the theft of cargo	
4h. Criminal acts involving the theft of cargo in parking areas along the TERN	

5 Miscellaneous

Please state your opinion on the following issues (1 = totally do not agree, 2 = not agree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = absolutely agree)

	1	2	3	4	5
5a. Our government treats criminal acts against the road transport of goods as a serious problem in our country?					
5b. Our government takes initiatives to increase security for the road transport of goods					
5c. Our government takes initiatives to increase security for the road transport of goods in parking areas along the TERN					
5d. Our government currently has concrete policy instruments focused on improving the security of the road transport of goods					

Organised theft of commercial vehicles and their loads in the European Union

5e. Our government has concrete plans to introduce policy instruments focused on improving the security of the road transport of goods					
5f. Our government is currently involved in pilot projects aimed at improving the security of the road goods transport					
5g. Our government is currently involved in pilot projects aimed at improving the security of the road goods transport in parking areas along the TERN					
5h. Our government facilitates initiatives to improve security for the road goods transport					
5j. Our government facilitates initiatives to improve security for the road goods transport in parking areas along the TERN					

PART 2 (Secured) parking areas

The following section contains questions about the number and characteristics of **truck parking areas along the TEN-T road network (TERN)** in your country.

NB. In questions 6a and 6b a reference is made to the list of Truck Parking Areas in Europe as published by the IRU/ ECMT in 2003

Please state your opinion on the following issues (1 = totally do not agree, 2 = not agree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, 5 = absolutely agree)

	1	2	3	4	5
6a. The IRU/ECMT list, in my opinion, is complete, in the sense that it includes all relevant truck parking areas along TERN in my country?					
6b. The quality of information given about the truck parking areas along the TERN in the list is satisfactory in my opinion?					

	1	2	3	4	5
7a. There are at present a sufficient number of truck parking areas along the TERN in my country ?					
7b. There are at present a sufficient number of truck parking areas along the TERN at border areas in my country ?					

	1	2	3	4	5
8a. The existing truck parking areas are generally secure (no abnormal risk)					
8b. There are enough SECURED parking areas along the TERN or near the border in my country					
8c. The security measures at secured parking areas along the TERN are sufficient in my country.					

9a. If there are not sufficient parking areas, where (in which specific region of your country) do you see the lack thereof?	
9b. If there are not sufficient secure parking areas, where (in which specific region of your country) do you see the lack thereof?	

PART 3 Legal and financial framework in relation to parking areas

The following section contains questions about the legal and financial framework in relation to (secured) **TRUCK PARKING areas ALONG THE TEN-T ROAD NETWORK (TERN)** in your country.

Notice these restrictions: also the term 'specific' in the questions refers to TRUCK PARKING and e.g. not to parking in general or not to general legislation/ requirements etc.

Planning

10a.	Is the number, location or size of truck parking areas along the TERN in your country an integral part of infrastructure network planning?	Yes	No	Not applicable
10b.	If yes, are specific security concerns important in the planning of the number, location or size of truck parking areas on the TERN?	Yes	No	Not applicable
10c.	What type of organisation initiates or plans the development of truck parking areas along the TERN ?	Private	Public	Mix private & public

Land ownership

11.	What type of organisation(s) own(s) the land on which truck parking areas along the TERN are built ?	Private	Public	Mix private & public
-----	--	---------	--------	----------------------

Contracting

12a.	Are there separate formal tendering procedures for the exploitation of truck parking areas along the TERN?	Always	Sometimes	Never	Not applicable
12b.	Are specific security requirements incorporated in the tendering process for truck parking areas?	Always	Sometimes	Never	Not applicable
12c.	Are there specific requirements in the exploitation contracts for truck parking security?	Always	Sometimes	Never	Not applicable

Exploitation

13a. What type of organisations are involved in the exploitation of parking areas?	Private	Public	Mix private & public
13b. Are there currently specific legal requirements in the field of security of parking areas for organisations that exploit these areas?		Yes	No
13c. Are such requirements planned (if they do not exist) or (if they already exist) to be extended in the near future ?		Yes	No
13d. Are there examples in your country where different types of exploiting organisations collaborate to improve truck parking security?		Yes	No
13e. Are truck parking rates usually determined by supply and demand in the market?	Completely	To some extent	No
13f.. Are truck parking rates usually dependent on the presence of security facilities?		Yes	No

On behalf of DG-TREN, thank you for completing this questionnaire.

**Please return this questionnaire to.....
(DETAILS CONSORTIUM PARTNER)**

ANNEX B TAPA EMEA Iis Incident Statistics

Details 2003-2006

The statistics includes all incidents registered by TAPA EMEA IIS between January 2003 and December 2006, which concerned trucks and truck loads (incl. Fraud).

Total number of registered incidents: 1.530


Total loss value: € 184.530.011

Total Value of 'Low Loss Value' (< 150.000): € 32.171.200 with 1.049 incidents

Total value of 'Medium Loss Value' (150.000 – 500.000): € 45.155.283 with 168 incidents

Total value of 'High Loss Value' (> 500.000): € 107.203.528 with 63 incidents

250 Incidents are reported without Loss Value (Unknown)



Total loss Value per Country (Top 10):



Total number of incidents per county (with Loss Value Graduation):

TOP 10:


Country	Number of Incidents	High Value	Medium Value	Low Value	Unknown Value
UK	451	42	67	232	110
France	193	5	16	149	23
Belgium	153	1	12	83	57
Germany	146	5	30	100	11
Netherlands	143	6	12	120	5
Italy	126	-	12	86	28
Spain	125	1	8	107	9
Sweden	60	1	1	55	3
Czech Rep	14	-	1	13	-
Poland	14	-	1	12	1

Total number of incidents per region (with Loss Value Graduation):


TOP 10:

Region	Country	Number of Incidents	High	Medium	Low	unknown
Greater London	GBR	133	14	26	60	33
West Midlands	GBR	100	10	5	62	23
Flemish Region	BEL	98	1	8	57	32
unknown	unknown	88	3	6	71	10
South East England	GBR	75	9	11	31	24
Île-de-France	FRA	58	4	5	44	5
Madrid	ESP	47	-	3	40	4
North Rhine-Westphalia	DEU	44	2	11	27	4
Lombardy	ITA	42	-	5	32	5
North Brabant	NLD	38	-	5	32	1

Total number of incidents per location:



Total number of incidents per category:



Total number of incidents per product category:

<i>Product Category</i>	<i>Number of Incidents</i>
Non-electronic	288
Consumer Electronics	247
Laptops & PDA'S	222
Unspecified	150
Various IT	145
Desktop, Server, Networking	134
Display (Monitor)	84
Mobile Phone	74
Peripheral (Hardware)	56
CPU	30
Supplies	28
Memory, Ram	21
Clothing and Footwear	17
HDD, Storage	12
Food and Beverage	11
Cash/Bullion	6
Pharmaceutical & Medical Products	4
Tobacco Products	1

Details 2003

Number of registered incidents in 2003: 342


Loss value in 2003: € 57.557.120

Value of 'Low Loss Value' (< 150.000): € 9.256.110 with 239 incidents

Value of 'Medium Loss Value' (150.000 – 500.000): € 9.870.460 with 38 incidents

Value of 'High Loss Value' (> 500.000): € 38.430.550 with 20 incidents

45 Incidents are reported without Loss Value (Unknown)



Loss Value per Country (Top 10):



Organised theft of commercial vehicles and their loads in the European Union

Number of incidents in 2003 per county (with Loss Value Graduation):

TOP 10:


Country	Number of Incidents	High	Medium	Low	Unknown
UK	140	15	23	74	28
France	60	1	4	48	7
Spain	25	1	-	20	4
Netherlands	24	-	2	21	1
Italy	24	-	4	16	4
Germany	23	2	3	17	1
Belgium	22	-	2	20	-
Sweden	5	-	-	5	-
Austria	5	-	-	5	-
Greece	4	-	-	4	-

Number of incidents in 2003 per region (with Loss Value Graduation):


TOP 10:

Region	Country	Number of Incidents	High	Medium	Low	Unknown
Greater London	GBR	52	9	12	23	8
unknown		35	2	2	30	1
South East England	GBR	33	-	5	15	13
Île-de-France	FRA	16	1	2	11	2
West Midlands	GBR	13	2	2	9	-
North West England	GBR	10	-	1	7	2
East of England	GBR	9	1	-	5	3
Rhône-Alpes	FRA	9	-	-	8	1
Madrid	ESP	8	-	-	6	2
Lombardy	ITA	8	-	1	6	1

Number of incidents in 2003 per location:



Number of incidents in 2003 per category:



Number of incidents in 2003 per product category:

<i>Product Category</i>	<i>Number of incidents</i>
Non-electronic	81
Consumer Electronics	50
Various IT	45
Peripheral (Hardware)	26
Laptops & PDA'S	25
Mobile Phone	25
Display (Monitor)	23
Desktop, Server, Networking	20
Unspecified	18
CPU	10
Supplies	8
Memory, Ram	7
Cash/Bullion	2
HDD, Storage	2

Details 2004

Number of registered incidents in 2004: 365


Loss value in 2004: € 35.305.521

Value of 'Low Loss Value' (< 150.000): € 6.538.701 with 168 incidents

Value of 'Medium Loss Value' (150.000 – 500.000): € 12.990.460 with 48 incidents

Value of 'High Loss Value' (> 500.000): € 15.776.360 with 15 incidents

116 Incidents are reported without Loss Value (Unknown)



Loss Value per Country (Top 10):




Number of incidents in 2004 per county (with Loss Value Graduation):
TOP 10:

Country	Number of Incidents	High	Low	Medium	Unknown
UK	94	8	17	46	23
Belgium	84	-	8	22	54
France	44	3	4	23	14
Italy	34	-	4	13	17
Netherlands	29	-	8	20	1
Sweden	20	1	-	17	2
Spain	18	-	2	13	3
Germany	16	2	3	9	2
Poland	4	-	-	4	-
Croatia	2	-	-	2	-


Number of incidents in 2004 per region (with Loss Value Graduation):
TOP 10:

Region	Country	Number of Incidents	High	Medium	Low	Unknown
Flemish Region	BEL	53	-	6	17	30
Greater London	GBR	27	1	6	15	5
Walloon Region	BEL	26	-	1	3	22
unknown		17	-	2	9	6
South East England	GBR	14	3	1	7	3
Île-de-France	FRA	14	2	1	8	3
North Brabant	NLD	14	-	4	9	1
East Midlands	GBR	13	1	4	3	5
West Midlands	GBR	11	1	-	8	2
East of England	GBR	9	1	2	6	-

Number of incidents in 2004 per location:



Number of incidents in 2004 per category:



Number of incidents in 2004 per product category:

<i>Product Category</i>	<i>Number of Incidents</i>
Non-electronic	87
Consumer Electronics	85
Various IT	44
Unspecified	42
Display (Monitor)	24
Laptops & PDA'S	23
Mobile Phone	17
Desktop, Server, Networking	10
Peripheral (Hardware)	9
Supplies	7
Memory, Ram	5
HDD, Storage	5
CPU	5
Cash/Bullion	2

Details 2005

Number of registered incidents in 2005: 329


Loss value in 2005: € 41.427.387

Value of 'Low Loss Value' (< 150.000): € 8.416.880 with 221 incidents


Value of 'Medium Loss Value' (150.000 – 500.000): € 11.837.363 with 42 incidents

Value of 'High Loss Value' (> 500.000): € 21.173.144 with 19 incidents

47 Incidents are reported without Loss Value (Unknown)



Loss Value per Country (Top 10):



Number of incidents in 2005 per county (with Loss Value Graduation):

TOP 10:


Country	Number of Incidents	High	Medium	Low	Unknown
UK	96	11	14	39	32
France	55	1	6	47	1
Italy	34	-	2	25	7
Netherlands	33	6	2	23	2
Germany	24	1	6	16	1
Spain	23	-	4	19	-
Sweden	21	-	1	19	1
Belgium	16	-	2	12	2
Poland	6	-	1	5	-
Greece	5	-	1	3	1

Number of incidents in 2005 per region (with Loss Value Graduation):


TOP 10:

Region	Country	Number of Incidents	High	Medium	Low	Unknown
Greater London	GBR	28	2	5	9	12
unknown		21	1	2	17	1
South East England	GBR	19	3	3	6	7
Île-de-France	FRA	15	1	2	12	-
West Midlands	GBR	14	4	-	4	6
Madrid	ESP	12	-	1	11	-
Stockholm	SWE	11	-	-	11	-
East of England	GBR	10	-	2	6	2
Flemish Region	BEL	10	-	1	8	1
North West England	GBR	10	-	2	5	3

Number of incidents in 2005 per location:



Number of incidents in 2005 per category:



Number of incidents in 2005 per product category:

<i>Product Category</i>	<i>Number of Incidents</i>
Non-electronic	87
Consumer Electronics	85
Various IT	44
Unspecified	42
Display (Monitor)	24
Laptops & PDA'S	23
Mobile Phone	17
Desktop, Server, Networking	10
Peripheral (Hardware)	9
Supplies	7
Memory, Ram	5
HDD, Storage	5
CPU	5
Cash/Bullion	2

Details 2006

Number of registered incidents in 2006: 494


Loss value in 2006: € 50.239.983

Value of 'Low Loss Value' (< 150.000): € 7.959.509 with 403 incidents

Value of 'Medium Loss Value' (150.000 – 500.000): € 10.457.000 with 40 incidents

Value of 'High Loss Value' (> 500.000): € 31.823.474 with 9 incidents

42 Incidents are reported without Loss Value (Unknown)



Loss Value per Country (Top 10):



Number of incidents in 2006 per county (with Loss Value Graduation):

TOP 10:


Country	Number of Incidents	High	Medium	Low	Unknown
UK	121	8	13	73	27
Germany	83	-	18	58	7
Spain	59	-	2	55	2
Netherlands	57	-	-	56	1
France	34	-	2	31	1
Italy	34	-	2	32	-
Belgium	31	1	-	29	-
Sweden	14	-	-	14	-
Czech Rep	10	-	1	9	-
Hungary	7	-	1	6	-

Number of incidents in 2006 per region (with Loss Value Graduation):


TOP 10:

Region	Country	Number of Incidents	High	Medium	Low	Unknown
West Midlands	GBR	62	3	3	41	15
Flemish Region	BEL	27	1	-	25	1
Greater London	GBR	26	2	3	13	8
Gelderland	NLD	26	-	-	26	-
North Rhine-Westphalia	DEU	26	-	8	14	4
Madrid	ESP	19	-	-	18	1
Lombardy	ITA	18	-	1	17	-
Catalonia	ESP	17	-	2	15	-
Lower Saxony	DEU	15	-	2	11	2
unknown	unknown	15	-	-	14	1

Number of incidents in 2006 per location:



Number of incidents in 2006 per category:



Number of incidents in 2006 per product category:

<i>Product Category</i>	<i>Number of Incidents</i>
Laptops & PDA'S	142
Desktop, Server, Networking	85
Unspecified	60
Non-electronic	54
Consumer Electronics	42
Display (Monitor)	26
Clothing and Footwear	17
Various IT	16
Peripheral (Hardware)	13
Food and Beverage	11
Mobile Phone	10
CPU	6
Supplies	6
Memory, Ram	4
HDD, Storage	2

ANNEX C Main Sources of Information

1. 'Crime in Road Freight Transport', European Conference of Ministers of Transport (ECMT), 2002
2. 'Zware Jongens op de Weg', *een onderzoek naar georganiseerde diefstal in de wegtransportsector*, Advies- en Onderzoeksgroep Beke, Juni 2006
3. 'A Review of the Current Knowledge and Statistical Development on Vehicle theft in the EU Member States', *Vehicle Crime in EU Member States from 1990 to 2002 Statistics, Policies and Good Practises*, Regioplan Beleidsonderzoek en Stichting Aanpak Voertuigcriminaliteit, October 2004
4. 'Towards an EU Agenda for Safer Professional Transport', *Application of Road Safety related Community Legislation in Transport Companies*, NEA/TRL/VTI/ISIS/DVR, July 2005
5. 'Kerncijfers Verkeersonveiligheid 2001', Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer Rijkswaterstaat, 2001
6. 'Integrale Veiligheidsrapportage 2002', Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2002
7. 'EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) 2006', Europol, 2006
8. 'Parsec; Study on the Feasibility of organising a Network of Secured Parking Areas for Road Transport Operators on the Trans European Road Network', NEA for DGTREN, 2007
9. 'IIS-database 2003-2006', Tapa Emea, 2006
10. 'Proefproject doorlichting Transportsector', *een verkenning in het kader van het programma Preventie Georganiseerde Criminaliteit (PPGC)*, Ministerie van Justitie, 2000

ANNEX D Main Results of the Stake-Holder Questionnaire

PART 1: Nature and extent of (organized) theft of loads

1a) Affected road transport market segments

	A		B		C		D	
L1	42,86 %	(9)	23,81 %	(5)	9,52 %	(2)	9,52 %	(2)
L2	23,81 %	(5)	42,86 %	(9)	9,52 %	(2)	14,29 %	(3)
L3	38,10 %	(8)	23,81 %	(5)	19,05 %	(4)	4,76 %	(1)
L4	28,57 %	(6)	23,81 %	(5)	28,57 %	(6)	9,52 %	(2)
L5	4,76 %	(1)	4,76 %	(1)	0,00 %	(0)	0,00 %	(0)

Legend:

- A nearly never
- B sometimes
- C quite often
- D very frequent

- L1 National scheduled road transport with preplanned trips
- L2 International scheduled road transport with preplanned trips
- L3 National non-scheduled or irregular transports
- L4 International non-scheduled or irregular transports
- L5 Other:

- () Absolute value

1b) Type of loads

Please note- for the purpose of this questionnaire:

High value per unit = Cargo with average value of more that €10 per kilo.

Medium to low value per unit = cargo with average value of €10-€3 per kilo

Raw materials, ores and other base products = cargo with a value less than €3 per kilo

	A		B		C		D	
L1	61,90 %	(13)	9,52 %	(2)	0,00 %	(0)	4,76 %	(1)
L2	14,29 %	(3)	23,81 %	(5)	33,33 %	(7)	14,29 %	(3)
L3	23,81 %	(5)	38,10 %	(8)	4,76 %	(1)	14,29 %	(3)
L4	66,67 %	(14)	4,76 %	(1)	4,76 %	(1)	4,76 %	(1)
L5	4,76 %	(1)	0,00 %	(0)	4,76 %	(1)	4,76 %	(1)

Legend:

- A nearly never
- B sometimes
- C quite often
- D very frequent

- L1 Cash and/or precious metals
- L2 Finished products of high value per unit
- L3 Finished products of medium to low value per unit
- L4 Raw materials, ores, and other base products
- L5 Other.

- () Absolute value

1c) Average value of lost loads

cash (€K)	high value (€K)	medium+ low (€K)	raw materials (€K)
50	238	67	30

1d) Thefts: shares (%)

cash (%)	high value (%)	medium+ low (%)	raw materials (%)
0,4	82,9	16,0	0,7

1e) Thefts: developments 2004-2006 (%)

YEAR	cash (%)	high value (%)	medium+ low (%)	OTHER (%)
2004	5,4	73,5	10,4	2,7
2005	0,0	82,6	13,9	3,5
2006	0,0	74,9	17,4	6,7

PART 2: Nature and extend of (organized) theft of commercial vehicles

2) Theft of commercial vehicles

2a) Total number of lost commercial vehicles
(average per company)

year	new heavy duty	new medium+ light	dated model heavy duty	dated model medium+ light
2005	0,0	0,1	0,5	0,1
2006	0,0	0,0	0,8	0,1

2b) Average value of lost commercial vehicles (€K)

new heavy duty	new medium+ light	dated model heavy duty	dated model medium+ light
40	35	20	20

2c) Development 2004-2006 (%)

Insufficient data

PART 3: Most common forms and methods of theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles

3a) Location of theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles (%)

year	loading/ unloading	driving	night rest	coffee break	other
2005					
- organized	12,9	22,7	50,7	9,2	4,5
- not-organized	19,8	9,8	39,3	5,2	25,9
2006					
- organized	16,0	21,4	41,3	17,9	3,4
- not-organized	21,4	4,3	33,5	12,4	28,4

3b) Form and method of theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles (%)

year	hold-up during driving	hold-up during rest	bogus delivery address	burglary during long rest	burglary during coffee	other
2005	9,5	4,5	3,9	50,4	15,6	16,1
2006	12,6	6,3	2,7	38,4	20,6	19,4

PART 4: Measures to tackle theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles

4a) Measures already taken to tackle theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles

	A		B		C		D	
L1	33,33 %	(7)	9,52 %	(2)	0,00 %	(0)	42,86 %	(9)
L2	52,38 %	(11)	28,57 %	(6)	0,00 %	(0)	14,29 %	(3)
L3	42,86 %	(9)	14,29 %	(3)	4,76 %	(1)	19,05 %	(4)
L4	47,62 %	(10)	4,76 %	(1)	0,00 %	(0)	33,33 %	(7)
L5	42,86 %	(9)	23,81 %	(5)	4,76 %	(1)	19,05 %	(4)
L6	4,76 %	(1)	4,76 %	(1)	0,00 %	(0)	9,52 %	(2)

Legend:

- A my company
- B my organization
- C my countries authorities
- D other
- L1 Special security training for drivers
- L2 Special security procedures for the company
- L3 Maintaining of lists of hot spots/ no go areas
- L4 Track record verification of new employees
- L5 Analysis of relevant past crimes and adoption of procedures
- L6 Other:
- () Absolute value

4b) Measures that should be taken (but are not yet taken) to tackle theft of loads and/or commercial vehicles

	A		B		C		D	
L1	14,29 %	(3)	0,00 %	(0)	0,00 %	(0)	28,57 %	(6)
L2	23,81 %	(5)	9,52 %	(2)	4,76 %	(1)	19,05 %	(4)
L3	19,05 %	(4)	0,00 %	(0)	23,81 %	(5)	23,81 %	(5)
L4	9,52 %	(2)	0,00 %	(0)	4,76 %	(1)	38,10 %	(8)
L5	14,29 %	(3)	4,76 %	(1)	19,05 %	(4)	19,05 %	(4)
L6	4,76 %	(1)	4,76 %	(1)	9,52 %	(2)	9,52 %	(2)

Legend:

- A my company
- B my organization
- C my countries authorities
- D other
- L1 Special security training for drivers
- L2 Special security procedures
- L3 Maintaining of lists of hot spots/ no go areas
- L4 Track record verification of new employees
- L5 Analysis of relevant past crimes and adoption of procedures
- L6 Other:
- () Absolute value

ANNEX E TAPA EMEA Members

16/11/06

Company

3Com Technologies
A. Visbeen & Zonen
ABX Logistics Worldwide
Acer
ACR Logistics UK Ltd
AGS-FreightWatch Europe
AIG Europe (UK) Ltd.
AIG Europe SA
Air Cargo Security
Air France
Allport Ltd.
AMD
Andy Forwarders Services Ltd
Aon Jauch & Hübener GmbH
Apple Computer Limited
b2b International Network AG
Bartolini
BAS Logistics
Bax Global (Benelux)
BAX Global (UK)
Bertelsmann
Bickel Logistics GmbH
British American Tobacco
Bureau Veritas
Cisco Systems
CNA Insurance Company
Compass Security Logistik
De Jong Special Services
Dell
DFDS Transport Ltd
DHL Express
DHL Freight GmbH
DHL Fulfilment GmbH
DHL Logistics
DHL World Wide Express
Die Schweizerische Post
Door to Door Couriers
Eagle Global Logistics
Emirates Airlines
Emons Cargo B.V.
Epson Europe
European Logistics Security Ltd
EUROWATCHCENTRAL Limited
Ewals Cargo Care s.r.o.
Exel
Expeditors
Express Logistics Ltd

Federale Polities (Brussels)
FET/Advanced Transport Ltd
Finland Post Corporation
Flextronics
Forward Logistics Heathrow Ltd.
Foxconn Electronics
Frans Maas B.V.
Fraport AG
FreightLine Logistics Ltd
FreightWatch International
Fujitsu-Siemens Computers
G4S Value Services BV
GE Equipment Services Europe B.V.
Gebrüder Weiss Ges.mbH
Geodis
Geopost UK
Gerling Allgemeine Versicherungs AG
Germanischer Lloyd Certification
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Gillette
Groenewout Consultant & Engineers
Groep H. Essers
Gucci Group NV
Hellmann Worldwide Logistics GmbH & Co
KG
Hewlett Packard Co.
IHG Logistics GmbH & Co. KG
Infineon Technologies AG
Ingram Micro
Initial City Link
Intel Corporation
Interport
Jan de Rijk Logistics
Japan Tobacco International
Kees Verheul
Kingston Technology Europe
Kintetsu World Express
Kintetsu World Express (Benelux)
KLG Europe Eersel BV
KLM Cargo
Kuehne & Nagel
L. Bos Transport B.V.
La Poste
Lufthansa Cargo
Lupprians Cargo Express Ltd
Maersk Logistics
Maltacourt Ltd
Marsh Ltd
Masped Logisztika Kft.
Menlo Worldwide
Menzies World Cargo

Metropolitan Police
Microsoft
Mitt Worldwide Logistics BV
Motorola
NEA
Nike
Nippon Express (D)
Nippon Express (UK)
Nippon Express Italia SRL
Norfolkline B.V.
Nova Logistik Express GmbH
Orbit Ltd International Forwarders
Orphee Beinoglou SA
PACT
Panalpina
PGG Transport GmbH
Philip Morris International
Policedepartment Frankfurt/Main
Posten AB
Qatar Airways Cargo
Raetsheren van Orden BV
Road Air Transport and Logistics
Rotra Forwarding
Royal Philips Electronics
Rutges Cargo
Rynart Group of Companies
Samsung
Schenker AG
Schipol Military Police
Seagate Technology
SecuTrans Europe B.V.
SGS UK Ltd.
Solectron
Sony Computer Entertainment Europe
Limited
Sony Logistics Operations Europe/Sony
UK Ltd.
Special Cargo Handling cc
Spedition Wirtz
Speedlink
STMicroelectronics
Sun Microsystems
Swissport International
System Plus Logistic Service GmbH &
Co.KG
Tabaknatie
TAPA EMEA
TAT Express
Tech Data
Time Shuttle GmbH
TMI Integrated Logistics

TNT
TNT Swiss Post AG
Toshiba Information Systems UK Ltd
Trans-O-Flex Schnell-Lieferdienst GmbH
Transit Transport Flensburg
Transportes Azkar S.A.
UC Transport BV
Unipart Group of Companies
US Customs
UTi Nederland B.V.
Versteijnen Int. Transport BV
Voigt-Logistik
Walsh Western UK Limited
Wincanton Trans European
Yusen Cargo

ANNEX F Abbreviations

CMR	Convention relative au contrat de transport international de Merchandises par Route.
CLECAT	European association for forwarding, transport, logistic and customs services.
DG IPOL	Directorate General Internal Policy of the European Parliament
DG TREN	Directorate General for Transport and Energy
ECMT	European Conference of Ministers of Transport
EP	European Parliament
IIS-database	Incident Information Service (maintained by TAPA EMEA)
FSR	Freight Security Requirements (maintained by TAPA EMEA)
LSP	Logistics Services Provider
OCTA	Organised Crime Threat Assessment (a report by Europol)
Parsec	Parking Security ('Study on the feasibility of organizing a network of secured parking areas for road transport operators on the Transport European Road Network'; NEA for DG-TREN: January 2007)
TEN-R	Trans European Network- Roads
TAPA EMEA	Transportation Asset Protection Association: Europe, Middle East and Africa
Truckpol	an UK national police database and support system
TSR	Transport Security Requirements (maintained by TAPA EMEA)
GRAFTON	Operation GRAFTON, the police led partnership with government and industry aiming at reducing freight crime in the area around London Heathrow